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ON COMMON SENSE AND THE
EVALUATION OF WITNESS CREDIBILITY
Steven I. Friedland*
The common law's dependence on the common sense of ju-
rors for determining witness credibility has been the subject of
widespread criticism in the psychological literature. The author
examines this criticism and the effect that admitting expert tes-
timony or providing special jury instructions about witness
credibility would have on the American judicial system. He
concludes that the traditional approach which excludes expert
testimony and special instructions should persist except in cer-
tain narrowly defined circumstances. The author proposes a
new rule of evidence that defines those circumstances.
"If there is ever devised a psychological test for the valua-
tion of witnesses, the law will run to meet it."'
IN THE AMERICAN criminal justice system, the jury2 evalu-
* Associate Professor of Law, Nova University Center for the Study of Law; B.A.,
State University of New York at Binghamton (1978); J.D., Harvard Law School (1981).
I wish to extend special thanks to Gayle Coleman and Brent Moody for their assis-
tance in the preparation of this Article and to Tony Chase, Michael Flynn, Kerri Barsh,
Joel Mintz, Michael Shames, Brian Cutler, Lilly Levi and Randolph Braccialarghe for
their useful comments on earlier drafts.
1. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 875 n.1 (rev. ed.
1970).
2. Criminal trials are jury trials, except when (1) the defendant knowingly and vol-
untarily waives his sixth-amendment right to a jury, e.g., Singleton v. State, 288 Ala. 519,
262 So. 2d 768 (1971) (With the consent of the State and the court, the defendant,
charged with a noncapital felony, may waive a jury trial, enter a plea of not guilty, and be
tried by a circuit judge without a jury.); State v. Long, 408 So. 2d 1221 (La. 1982) (When
a defendant was personally informed by the court of his right to a jury trial and the judge
accepted the defendant's waiver, the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily and,
therefore, was operative), or (2) the maximum sentence for the charge is six months or
less, e.g., Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1988) (The United States Constitu-
tion does not require a right of trial by jury for "petty offenses."); Brookens v. Committee
on Unauth. Practice of Law, 538 A.2d 1120 (D.C. 1988) (The right to a jury trial in
contempt proceedings is limited to those cases resulting in imprisonment for more than six
months.).
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ates witness credibility. s Whether the witness is an eyewitness to
an alleged robbery,4 an expert on accounting procedures, 5 or a
complainant in a sexual abuse case," jurors must determine if they
believe the witness. Jurors are expected to make credibility deci-
sions based on their common sense, which is also termed intuition7
or experience.8 This concept of common sense is considered essen-
tial to the jury's task. When jurors exercise their common sense in
evaluating a witness' testimony, a full and fair credibility determi-
nation is presumed to follow.9 Special assistance from a judge or
expert, therefore, would be superfluous'0 and invade the exclusive
province of the jury."
In recent years, the accuracy of common sense credibility as-
sessments by jurors has been the subject of considerable scrutiny.
First, the Supreme Court of the United States acknowledged that
3. E.g., State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 1986); Commonwealth v. O'Sears,
466 Pa. 224, 352 A.2d 30 (1976).
It is the judge's task, however, to rule on witness competency. E.g., FED. R. EvID.
104(a). In federal courts, "[e]very person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise
provided in [the Federal Rules of Evidence]." FED. R. EvID. 601. In many state courts, the
judge may exclude witnesses, such as children or the mentally impaired, as incompetent
under certain circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Struss, 404 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1987) (defining the circumstances in which a court may find a child under ten years
of age incompetent to testify as when a child "lacks capacity to remember or to relate
truthfully facts respecting which [he is] examined").
4. E.g., Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959 (6th Cir. 1983); People v. Davis, 144
A.D.2d 379, 533 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1988); State v. Brown, 549 A.2d 1373 (R.I. 1988).
5. E.g., United States v. Black, 644 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1981); Patterson v. Com-
monwealth, 3 Va. App. 1, 348 S.E.2d 285 (1986).
6. E.g., State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 1986).
7. E.g., Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV.
1065, 1091 (1968) (concluding that the use of statistical decision theory to determine wit-
ness credibility would be unbearably complicated if it was not left to a "factfinding body
that could reach intuitive judgments based at least in part on its own experience").
8. E.g., Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837 (1973) (The jury could use its com-
mon sense and experience in deciding that the defendant knew he had possession of stolen
property.).
9. See Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 453 N.E.2d 1204 (1983) (Jurors'
common sense enables them to fully and fairly assess eyewitness testimony without the aid
of expert testimony on memory functions.).
10. Cross-examination by counsel, argument from counsel and observations of the
witness' demeanor are considered sufficient to enable jurors to make an accurate assess-
ment of a witness' credibility. Id.
11. E.g., State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 602, 645 P.2d 1330, 1334 (1982); State v.
Kekaualua, 50 Haw. 130, 132, 433 P.2d 131, 133 (1967); State v. Brodniak, 221 Mont.
212, 222, 718 P.2d 322, 329 (1986); Lessard v. State, 719 P.2d 227, 233 (Wyo. 1986);
State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251, 1255 (R.I. 1981); United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d




eyewitness identification testimony may mislead the jury. Conse-
quently, the Court shaped legal rules for line-ups and other identi-
fication procedures to minimize prejudice.12 Second, key witnesses
who recanted their testimony publicly after the conclusion of the
trials in which they testified have received considerable public-
ity.13 Finally, mounting empirical data from psychological studies
suggest that lay persons such as jurors inadequately evaluate the
testimony of others."' These psychological studies, in effect, sug-
gest that common sense is a myth.
The growing awareness of the alleged inaccuracy of juror
credibility assessments based exclusively on common sense has led
lawyers to make proffers of expert psychological testimony15 and
ask for special jury instructions 16 concerning witness credibility.
These proffers have occurred predominantly in criminal cases in-
volving such issues as the battered woman's syndrome7 and the
12. E.g., Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (Identification testimony is ad-
missible only if it is reliable as determined by various, enumerated factors.); United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-29 (1967) (A criminal defendant is entitled to counsel at a
post-indictment line-up because, inter alia, "the vagaries of eyewitness identification are
well known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.").
13. E.g., Frank v. State, 142 Ga. 617, 83 S.E. 233 (1914) (involving the recantation
of testimony almost 50 years after the trial); State v. Dotson, 163 Ill. App. 3d 419, 516
N.E.2d 718 (1987) (involving the celebrated 1985 recantation of purported rape victim
Kathleen Coswell Webb, six years after trial).
14. Greer, Anything But the Truth? The Reliability of Testimony in Criminal Tri-
als, 11 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 131, 133-35 (1971) (discussing several studies by legal
scholars which demonstrate the inaccuracy of juries in evaluating eyewitness testimony).
15. The subject matter of the testimony usually concerns testimonial capacities:
memory, perception, and narration. See generally Brigham, The Accuracy of Eyewitness
Evidence: How Do Attorneys See It?, 55 FLA. B.J. 714, 720-21 (1981) (suggesting use of
expert witnesses on the accuracy of eyewitness testimony would help jurors focus on factors
found critically important in making a correct identification).
This testimony focuses most often on the selectivity of perception, cross-racial effects
on identification, the lack of correlation between a witness' level of confidence and the
reliability of her identification, and the effect of repeated viewings. E.g., People v. Brooks,
128 Misc. 2d 608, 610, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692, 694-95 (West. Cty. Ct. 1985) ("[A]dmission of
the proffered testimony, when limited to an explication of the factors which studies have
shown are relevant to making a reliable identification, is proper expert testimony and will
enhance the ability of the jury to reach its decision in this case.").
Some psychologists have been retained in a considerable number of cases. E.g. United
States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1106 (6th Cir. 1984) ("Dr. Fulero and another expert in
the field, Dr. Loftus, have appeared as experts in over 60 criminal cases.").
16. E.g., United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (contain-
ing sample jury instructions).
17. E.g., State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 478 A.2d 364 (1984) (Trial court held to have
improperly excluded expert testimony offered to prove the state of mind of the defendant
claiming the battered woman's syndrome as a defense to her murder charge.).
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unreliability of eyewitnesses, 8 although experts who would testify
simply about "memory" have also been offered as witnesses.' 9
Most courts have rejected the proffered testimony and instruc-
tions.20 Such rejection is not surprising, since the use of psycholog-
ical data runs counter to the traditional view that the jurors' com-
mon sense is the only mechanism necessary for assessing
credibility. In a small but growing minority of jurisdictions, how-
ever, courts have permitted expert psychological witnesses or used
special jury instructions to educate jurors about the evaluation of
credibility, and control their discretion in credibility matters."
The reasons courts use to support the admission or exclusion
of psychological data vary considerably. 2 Instead of establishing a
stable and acceptable relationship between intuitive and empiri-
cally assisted credibility evaluations, the judicial response has
18. E.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) (Court held that
expert testimony concerning the unreliability of eyewitnesses should be allowed when meet-
ing standard of Fed. R. Evid. § 702. Eyewitnesses are subject to: diminishing memory of
the facts; inaccuracy of perception and the distortion of one's subsequent recall due to
stress; incorporating inaccurate information gathered after the event; "unconscious trans-
fer" of visualization of defendant resulting in an incorrect identification in a line-up; unreli-
ability of cross-racial identification; and inaccurate identification due to lighting, distance,
and duration.); State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983) (The court held
that expert testimony regarding unreliability of eyewitness should have been admitted
where eyewitnesses identified defendant in a photo lineup over one year after the event
occurred, recognizing the following factors in assessing the accuracy of identification: di-
minishing memory of the facts; the effect of stress upon perception; "unconscious transfer";
the assimilation of post-event information; and, the question of confidence and its relation-
ship to accuracy.); see generally Loftus & Schneider, Behold With Strange Surprise: Judi-
cial Reactions To Expert Testimony Concerning Eyewitness Reliability, 56 UMKC L.
REV. 1 (1987) (examining the contradictions and conflicts involved in the admissibility of
expert testimony for the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, and supporting the use of
expert testimony in this area given the recent scientific advances and courts' new under-
standing of the psychological principles of such testimony).
19. E.g., United States v. Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451, 1458 (10th Cir. 1985) (The trial
court in a securities fraud case properly excluded expert testimony about the defendant's
memory on the ground that an untrained layman could intelligently evaluate the evidence
without expert assistance.). For a discussion of the Affieck case, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 148-51.
20. E.g., United States v. Christophe, 833 F.2d 1296 (9th Cir. 1987) (jurors are
aware of the problems of eyewitness identification); Affleck, 776 F.2d 1451 (testimony of
"memory" expert not admitted because jurors understand that witnesses forget); United
States v. Fischer, 587 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (work
in the field of ethnic eyewitness identification still inadequate, thus it does not qualify as
specialized knowledge).
21. For further discussion of the use of expert testimony about credibility, see In-
gulli, Trial By Jury: Reflections On Witness Credibility, Expert Testimony, and Recanta-
tion, 20 VAL. U.L. REv. 145 (1986).
22. Infra section III, pp. 188-209.
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added to the long-standing controversy about the role of social sci-
ence in the trial system.
This Article explores the tension between common sense-
based and empirical evaluations of credibility. While the subject
of the paper is the relationship between common sense and the
empirical psychological approach generally, this Article uses the
most common manifestation of this empiricism, expert psychologi-
cal testimony, as representative of the empirical approach.
One of the most common arguments advanced in favor of ex-
cluding psychological experts and their data is that such evidence
lacks utility. The expert allegedly reiterates what the jury already
knows intuitively, and the existence of traditional safeguards, such
as cross-examination, renders assistance to the jurors unnecessary.
In addition, the evidence arguably creates unfair prejudice due to
the unreliability of the data, its manner of communication, or the
inability of the jury to evaluate it properly.
The Article's central thesis is that these doctrinal evidentiary
arguments, although strong, are inadequate in resolving whether
such evidence should be admitted. An alternative analytical ap-
proach, therefore, is necessary. Under this approach it becomes
apparent that expert psychological assistance, while possibly pro-
moting more accurate results, undermines the jury function of
community representation. As a general rule, therefore, it must be
excluded. The Article further concludes, however, that when a
credibility assessment is central to the outcome of the case and
corroborative evidence is largely or entirely lacking, psychological
data should be admitted to further the policy of protecting the
criminal defendant's presumption of innocence.
Section I discusses the basic concepts underlying the jury
function generally, with emphasis on the criminal jury system,23
credibility, and common sense. Section II describes the psycholo-
gists' critique of the traditional approach to credibility assessment.
Section III examines how federal and state courts have treated the
admissibility of empirical assistance to credibility evaluations and
suggests that the rationales used for both the inclusion and exclu-
sion of such expert testimony are unpersuasive and indeterminate.
Section IV then explains that because of the inadequacy of the
23. Although the analysis in this paper is applicable to both civil and criminal cases,
the focus will be on criminal matters because they raise significant constitutional and pol-
icy considerations that best reveal the difficulty of creating a coherent framework for evalu-
ating witness credibility.
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evidentiary doctrinal analysis, a different critique, based on policy
considerations, is necessary to evaluate the propriety of assisting
the jury on credibility questions. This alternative critique reverses
the roles that common sense and empirically assisted credibility
evaluations play today in the courts. Finally, in Section V, the
Article offers a codification of its conclusions, embodied in a rule
of evidence specifically designed to deal with common sense and
psychological testimony on credibility assessments.
I. COMMON SENSE AND THE JURY FUNCTION
The jury system is the backbone of the American criminal
process. In Duncan v. Louisiana,24 Justice White noted that:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to
prevent oppression by the Government. . . . The deep commit-
ment of the Nation to the right of jury trial in serious criminal
cases as a defense against arbitrary law enforcement qualifies
for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment .... 15
The Court concluded that trial by jury in serious criminal cases26
is a fundamental part of the American system of justice.27
24. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
25. Id. at 155-56. Justice White, however, further noted: "Of course jury trial has
'its weaknesses and the potential of misuse.'" Id. at 156 (quoting Singer v. United States,
380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965)). He also remarked that: "We are aware of the long debate, espe-
cially in this century, among those who write about the administration of justice, as to the
wisdom of permitting untrained laymen to determine the facts in civil and criminal pro-
ceedings." Id. at 156-57. Justice White then noted that the debate about the jury system is
stronger in the context of civil juries as compared to criminal juries. Id. at 157.
26. Id. at 157-58. Later cases have held that the right to a jury trial exists for all
felony cases as well as misdemeanor cases in which the defendant could receive a prison
sentence of more than six months. E.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1969)
(defining a nonpetty, jury-triable offense as a case "where imprisonment for more than six
months is authorized").
27. But see Duncan, 391 U.S. at 172 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the trial
by jury is not so fundamental that it should be incorporated pursuant to the 14th amend-
ment of the Constitution.). Justice Harlan reasoned that flexibility is warranted because of
variations in local conditions, as in the size of the caseload and the ease of summoning
jurors, and because other trial conditions concerning fairness also play a great role in the
way a trial system should be structured. Id. at 193. Justice Harlan concluded, therefore,
that the incorporation doctrine would be more of a straitjacket to the states if applied to
jury trials than anything else. Id. at 175-76. Safeguards are available, he suggested, in the
form of the political process and resort to the courts, to protect the fairness of trials. Id. at
193. He concluded that by requiring jury trials, the "Court has chosen to impose upon
every State one means of trying criminal cases; it is a good means, but is not the only fair
means, and it is not demonstrably better than the alternatives States might devise." Id.
[Vol. 40:165
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This Section discusses the goals of the jury system, with em-
phasis on criminal cases. It also explores the meaning of credibil-
ity and common sense.
A. Objectives of the Jury System
1. Truth-finding
The American criminal justice system is often viewed primar-
ily as a quest for truth.28 The adversarial design of the system, in
which opposing parties "fight" each other on questions of law and
fact, is believed to promote the discovery of truth. 9 The jury's
role is to weigh the evidence and arguments presented by the com-
batants and thereby reach the truth.
The rules of evidence, in large part, are designed to further
the truth-seeking end of the criminal justice system. The admissi-
bility of only relevant evidence maximizes the opportunity for ju-
rors to determine accurately what happened.30 The cross-examina-
tion of witnesses further ensures that jurors develop an accurate
picture.31 The admissibility of expert testimony that explains other
evidence or provides additional information is also designed to as-
sist the jury in achieving an accurate determination of the facts.3 2
The jury verdict is generally considered to be "a statement
about what happened.13 3 In essence, the verdict is treated as "a
28. As one commentator has stated:
The men who compose our trial courts, judges and juries, in each law-suit con-
duct an intelligent inquiry into all the practically available evidence, in order to
ascertain, as near as may be, the truth about the facts of that suit. . . . Such a
method can yield no more than a guess, nevertheless an educated guess.
J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL, MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 80 (1949); Nes-
son, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1360 (1985) ("A trial is ostensibly structured as a truth-seeking
process concerned with justice for the parties.").
29. J. FRANK, supra note 28, at 80 ("Many lawyers maintain that the 'fight' theory
and the 'truth' theory coincide. They think that the best way for a court to discover the
facts in a suit is to have each side strive as hard as it can, in a keenly partisan spirit
30. See FED. R. EvID. 402 (All relevant evidence is admissible unless excluded by
another law.).
31. See Delaware v. Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) (The defendant's right to cross-
examine witnesses is protected by the Confrontation Clause of the sixth amendment, al-
though failure to permit cross-examination may be harmless error.). FED. R. EvID. 611 (b)
(assuming a right of cross-examination, but limiting it to "the subject matter of the direct
examination and matters affecting the credibility of the witness").
32. See FED. R. EVID. 702.
33. Nesson, supra note 28, at 1358 (the object of a verdict is to state a conclusion
about a past event rather than a conclusion about the evidence.).
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surrogate for discoverable truth. 34 While it may be impossible for
a jury to reconstruct prior events with complete accuracy, the law
acknowledges its confidence in the jury's evaluations by using non-
quantifiable standards of proof such as "beyond a reasonable
doubt." 5
2. Dispute Resolution
The jury system also attempts to resolve disputes and provide
finality, whether or not the actual truth has been discovered.
Thus, when the parties agree to the disposition of any matter, no
truth is sought with respect to that issue and the system is spared
an exhaustive and time-consuming search for relevant evidence. In
many disputes, moreover, the facts are simply not available. In
such cases, burdens of persuasion and production declare the win-
ner regardless of the lack of evidence. Statutes of limitations and
rules excluding evidence that causes undue delay or constitutes a
waste of time also serve the dispute resolution goal. 6
3. Representation-Reinforcement
To a large degree, the jury is a symbol of democratic ideals.
A representative jury symbolizes "[t]he common meaning of de-
mocracy, [which] is 'government or rule by the people, either di-
rectly or through elected representatives.' . . . [This] concept of
democracy . . . refers to a method of governing that specifies who
rules, or, in other words, who decides what values will control the
34. Id. at 1363-64 n.21.
35. The 'beyond a reasonable doubt standard' is not quantifiable. A sample jury in-
struction is illustrative:
A reasonable doubt is not a possible doubt, a speculative, imaginary or
forced doubt. Such a doubt must not influence you to return a verdict of not
guilty if you have an abiding conviction of guilt. On the other hand, if, after
carefully considering, comparing and weighing all the evidence, there is not an
abiding conviction of guilt, or, if, having a conviction, it is one which is not
stable but one which wavers and vacillates, then the case is not proved beyond
every reasonable doubt and you must find the defendant not guilty because the
doubt is reasonable. It is to the evidence introduced upon this trial, and to it
alone, that you are to look for that proof. A reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
the defendant may arise from the evidence, conflict in the evidence or the lack of
evidence . . ..
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT, COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL
CASES, FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES § 2.03 (1981).
36. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (excluding relevant evidence when probative value is
substantially outweighed by considerations of undue delay and wasted time).
[Vol. 40:165
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resolution of disputes. ' 37 The jury's representativeness is assured
by the constitutional requirement that the jury contain a cross-
section of the community in which the trial is held.38 Thus, the
trial result obtains validity not only because it defines the truth
and resolves a dispute, but also because it is reinforced by the
presumptive approval of the community. The jury system thereby
generates confidence and trust in the criminal justice system as a
whole.
Acting with the putative approval of the community, the jury
that returns a guilty verdict determines that the defendant merits
moral condemnation for his actions. Thus, the jury acts both as
moralist and as fact-finder. "Moralists . . . purport to help courts
make difficult moral choices by offering unadorned edicts on the
goodness or badness of persons, acts, or rules of law." 3
The jury as moralist is reflected in the jury's power to "nul-
lify" the evidence before it. As one commentator noted:
Under this doctrine the jury is expected to inject community
values into its verdict even in derogation of the law created by
legislature and described by the judge in instructions. This view
of nullification prevailed at the time the United States Constitu-
tion was adopted. The Founding Fathers knew that, absent jury
nullification, judicial tyranny not only was a possibility, but was
a reality in the colonial experience. Although scholars continue
to debate the historical and policy justifications for jury nullifi-
cation, there can be no doubt that American juries exercise that
power. Many established trial procedures insulate from judicial
review all but a few of the most egregious examples of jury law-
making." 40
37. Gold, Covert Advocacy: Reflections on the Use of Psychological Persuasion
Techniques in the Courtroom, 65 N.C.L. REV. 481, 498-99 (1987) (citation omitted).
38. The sixth amendment requires that juries be impartial. "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
. " U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI. Courts have interpreted the sixth amendment's right of
impartiality to require a cross-section of the population on juries. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (The Court concluded that juries are to include women and accepted
"the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment and [we] are convinced that the requirement has solid foundation.");
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945) (juries to include people regardless of their race); see
also Gold, supra note 37, at 499 ("In theory, the jury is composed of individuals reflecting
a representative cross-section of the people living in the community in which the case
arises.").
39. Delgado & McAllen, The Moralist as Expert Witness, 62 B.U.L. REv. 869, 872
(1982).
40. Gold, supra note 37, at 498-500.
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Actual public confidence in and acceptance of the jury's verdict
are vital to the judicial system.4 1 The truth-serving, dispute resolu-
tion and representation-reinforcement functions of the jury all
contribute to public approval. If a criminal conviction is to serve a
cathartic function for the community, the guilty verdict must gen-
erally receive actual community support.42 Similarly, in civil
cases, there can be no finality or enforcement of decisions without
the public's approval.
Most of the jury's work is shielded from public view in order
to promote community approval.43 The secrecy of jury delibera-
tions, for example, minimizes public scrutiny of the jury function.
It insulates verdicts from criticism by protecting the jury's analy-
sis and rationale. The jury verdict, moreover, is a general one,
without any stated explanation for the decision. This generality
further protects the jury's decision from reproach or second-
guessing.
B. Credibility
Credibility is the value a jury will place on a witness' testi-
mony. A credibility assessment depends on the perceived accuracy
and truthfulness of the testimony. Jurors must evaluate the credi-
bility of all witnesses, including eyewitnesses, expert witnesses (i.e.
medical doctors), children, and even nontestifying witnesses whose
hearsay statements are properly introduced for the jury's
consideration.
For the purposes of this Article, "credibility" includes jury
evaluations of a witness' demeanor, perception, memory, narration
and sincerity. "Testimony on credibility" embraces comments that
are directed specifically at another witness' accuracy or veracity
as well as comments that implicitly corroborate or undermine the
other witness' accuracy or veracity. Testimony about the rape
trauma and battered person syndromes are based on psychological
assessments of others and fall within the definition of credibility
testimony.44 Testimony about the premenstrual stress syndrome,
41. Nesson, supra note 28, at 1363, 1367 (acceptance of jury verdict as a statement
about a past event required to believe that consequent punishment is justified).
42. Such catharsis is considered necessary on a psychoanalytic level to prevent the
community from falling prey to vigilantism. See 0. RANK, MODERN EDUCATION 12
(1932).
43. See Nesson, supra note 28, at 1365-69.
44. On the admissibility of psychological expert testimony in rape trauma syndrome
cases, see Massaro, Experts, Psychology. Credibility and Rape: The Rape Trauma Syn-
[Vol. 40:165
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however, a primarily physiological and not psychological state,
does not fall within the definition. 5
Most expert psychological testimony about credibility touches
the credibility of particular witnesses only indirectly.46 Indirect
psychological testimony on credibility takes several forms. Experts
may refer to specific characteristics or behavioral responses com-
mon to a group of individuals such as battered children or eyewit-
nesses. These behavioral patterns may have been discovered
through observing or working with the group studied, or through
clinical studies.
Testimony may also cover a particular scientific syndrome
that describes and explains certain behavioral responses, such as
the rape trauma syndrome or battered woman's syndrome.4 Such
testimony often includes a general exposition of psychological or
other principles that combine to form the syndrome. Occasionally,
an expert may testify directly on a witness' actions, as when an
expert is called to explain the actions of a defendant who claims
the battered woman's defense.48 The common thread to all expert
testimony, direct or indirect, however, is that it is introduced to
enable jurors to better understand and evaluate the motives or be-
havior of a witness. 49 Of course, even testimony that is indirect
and general is not necessarily objective. General testimony is still
drome and Implications for Expert Psychological Testimony, 69 MINN L. REv. 395
(1985); Note, Checking the Allure of Increased Conviction Rates: The Admissibility of
Expert Testimony On Rape Trauma Syndrome in Criminal Proceedings, 70 VA. L. REv.
1657 (1984) [hereinafter VIRGINIA Note]. On the admissibility of psychological expert tes-
timony to aid the jury in determining the credibility 9f a self-defense plea in battered child
syndrome cases, see Hicks, Admissibility of Expert Testimony on the Psychology of the
Battered Child, 11 LAw & PSYCHOLOGY REv. 103 (1987).
45. For a discussion of why expert testimony should be admitted to substantiate a
defense of premenstrual stress syndrome in criminal cases, see Note, Premenstrual Stress
Syndrome as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 1983 DUKE L.J. 176 (1983).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Hiss, 88 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 185 F.2d 822
(2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 948 (1951) (psychiatric testimony to impeach the
credibility of the government's key witness in a perjury trial held admissible). For a de-
tailed discussion of the case, see A. WEINSTEIN, PERJURY AND THE HISS-CHAMBERS CASE
(1978).
47. See supra notes 17 and 44.
48. See supra note 17.
49. Expert testimony on credibility is not always used, however. In one case, for
example, the prosecutor for the state elicited the testimony of several witnesses that de-
fendant Richardson lacked remorse in the hours after he had killed his seven children by
poisoning them. This testimony seemed especially damaging. The defense called no medical
experts who might have testified that lack of remorse was a normal reaction. Flowers &
Gallagher, Poisoned Justice, Miami Herald, Dec. 11, 1988 (Tropic), at 21, col. 2.
1989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
used to bolster or diminish the jurors' opinions about the credibil-
ity of one or more witnesses.
C. Common Sense
Attempts to define common sense with precision have proven
futile.50 The continued survival of the notion of common sense
may be due to the fact that a precise definition is neither needed
nor available. If common sense is used to assess credibility be-
cause jurors are responsible for determining guilt and innocence
on behalf of the community, the concept of common sense is sy-
nonymous with "the average community viewpoint." Common
sense embraces, therefore, the broad disparity of experiences and
approaches to credibility that may exist in a representative cross-
section of the community. Such a concept defies simple definition.
There are two possible justifications for the judicial system's
reliance on the jurors' common sense to determine credibility.
First, on a practical level, jurors, as mature citizens, can be ex-
pected to have made many credibility assessments in the contexts
of their jobs, social relationships, formal education and other as-
pects of everyday life. Second, on a normative level, reliance on
common sense enhances the representation-reinforcement goal of
the jury system. Because the jurors represent a cross-section of the
community,51 their common sense is representative of the morals,
values and experience of the community. Thus, the use of common
sense ensures democratic verdicts and enhances the perceived and
actual fairness of the judicial system.
1. Applying Common Sense
To assess the credibility of a witness, jurors apply their com-
mon sense in different ways. One method is the use of analogy. A
juror may compare the statements of the witness to the juror's
own experiences or education. The witness may testify, for exam-
ple, that it took a certain amount of time to walk a city block. The
juror may compare that statement with her own experience of
walking city blocks. A juror may also compare the characteristics
50. For example, common sense has been defined as "[tihe endowment of natural
intelligence possessed by rational beings; ordinary, normal or average understanding; the
plain wisdom which is everyone's inheritance." 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 573
(2d ed. 1989). This definition does not shed much light on the subject.
51. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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of the particular witness to what he believes is typical of a person
in the witness' situation. Thus, a witness who testifies about a per-
sonal tragedy may be judged against the reaction expected of an
individual who has suffered that or similar harm.
Similarly, a juror's education, in the form of information re-
ceived from others, may provide a basis for comparison. The juror
may measure what the witness says against information the juror
has received from books, television, friends, teachers or others.
Jurors may also focus on a witness' demeanor in making com-
parisons. Demeanor may consist of nonverbal cues such as body
language, manner of dress, accent, manner of speech, or other in-
tangibles. 2 The juror may form subjective impressions about the
witness' veracity from observation of his demeanor while
testifying.5
The use of common sense to assess credibility may require,
however, no analogy whatsoever.54 Jurors are not required to use
their common sense in any particular form or manner. Thus, the
application of common sense to credibility may be an instinct, a
hunch or an unarticulable gut reaction.
2. The Scope of Common Sense
The scope of the jurors' common sense is determined by the
court. Courts have drawn the parameters broadly, although they
have imposed various limitations. If a court decides that a credi-
bility issue lies outside the realm of common experience, assis-
tance in the form of expert testimony or special jury instructions
may be permissible.5
52. See Ingulli, supra note 21, at 147.
53. Id.; see also Delaware V. Fernsterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985) (Even when a wit-
ness cannot recall the basis of his opinion, the factfinder can assess the witness' demeanor.).
54. Cf. C. NORRIs, DERRIDA 49 (1987) (Where a mimic performance had no prior
model, "then there is simply no appealing to a concept. . . that would always point back
to a truth or reality beyond the mere play of textual inscription.").
55. "The decision of whether or not to admit expert testimony respecting credibility
will, of course, rest in the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal
unless it is manifestly erroneous or a clear abuse of discretion." State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598,
607, 645 P.2d 1330, 1338 (1982). Moreover,
[e]xpert testimony respecting witness credibility is not, of course, appropriate to
all situations. In most cases, the common experience of the jury should suffice as
a basis for assessments of credibility. In such cases, even though an expert's
assessment of credibility may arguably provide the jury with potentially useful
information, the possibility that the jury might be unduly influenced by an ex-
pert's opinion would mitigate against admission. When, however, the nature of a
witness's mental or physical condition is such that the common experience of the
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II. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF EVALUATING
CREDIBILITY
The results of psychological studies on, and systematic obser-
vations about, witnesses suggest that common sense-based beliefs
about witnesses are deficient.5 6 The studies have brought to light
counter-intuitive factors that can affect credibility assessment and
do not form a part of the lay understanding of credibility. These
factors are discussed below.
A. Psychological Assessments of Credibility Evaluations
The reliability of a "fact" witness eyewitness identification
generally "depends on [the witness'] capacity to perceive, remem-
ber, and articulate what occurs before him."58 It is widely ac-
cepted that the processes of perception, memory, and narration
may have defects that affect the reliability of the witness.59 The
jury may represent a less than adequate foundation for assessing the credibility
of a witness, the testimony of an expert is far more likely to be of value, and
thus more likely to be admissible when its probative value is measured against
its prejudicial effects. Other courts and commentators have recognized such tes-
timony in situations to include those involving the allegedly mentally ill witness
and the mentally retarded witness and . . . child complainants whose claims are
substantially uncorroborated.
Id. at 607, 645 P.2d at 1337-38 (citing People v. Russel, 69 Cal. 2d 187, 443 P.2d 794, 70
Cal. Rptr. 210, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 864 (1968) (discussing use of psychiatric testimony
where a child's sex offense claims were substantially uncorroborated); People v. Parks, 41
N.Y.2d 36, 359 N.E.2d 358, 390 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1976) (concerning expert testimony in the
form of a psychiatric exam for child witnesses); Saxe, Psychiatry, Psychoanalysis and the
Credibility of Witnesses, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 238 (1970) (concerning the use of expert
testimony where witnesses have psychoses, neuroses, antisocial behavior, mental retardation
or suffer from alcoholism or drug dependence).).
56. Greer, supra note 14, at 133-35 (discussing several studies by legal scholars
which demonstrate the inaccuracy of juries in evaluating eyewitness testimony). In addition
to psychologists, others, including lawyers, have performed studies or experiments. In 1905,
for example, Wigmore conducted a series of "Testimonial and Verdict Experiments" at
Northwestern University Law School in Chicago. See id. at 134-35.
57. E.g., Cutler, Penrod & Stuve, Juror Decision Making in Eyewitness Identifica-
tion Cases, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 53-54 (1988) (concluding that jurors lack the
knowledge and skills to assess the reliability of eyewitness identification); see infra text
accompanying notes 83-85. Cf. Greer, supra note 14, at 131-32 (criticizing the hearsay
exception for dying declarations as based on a "judicial hunch").
58. Comment, Unreliable Eyewitness Evidence: The Expert Psychologist and the
Defense in Criminal Cases, 45 LA. L. REV. 721, 723 (1985) [hereinafter LOUISIANA
Comment].
59. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's note (Nonverbal conduct which
was not intended as an assertion by the actor is not hearsay, even though "evidence of this




nature and extent of these defects have become the focal point of
much psychological research.6
In a typical study on the question of eyewitness identification,
performed in 1988, subjects acted as jurors in a mock case involv-
ing a defendant accused of robbing a liquor store.6 1 The primary
evidence against the defendant was the victim's eyewitness identi-
fication. The jurors were tested for various factors affecting their
assessment of the victim's credibility. 2 The authors concluded
that "jurors do not possess the knowledge and skills necessary to
adequately assess the reliability of eyewitness identifications."63
This and other studies suggest two major deficiencies in the
use of jurors' common sense to decide questions of credibility.
First, jurors sometimes lack the necessary experience with which
to judge the veracity of a witness' assertions.6 4 This deficiency ex-
ists primarily with respect to such witnesses as the mentally ill
and mentally retarded,65 rape victims66 and child sexual abuse vic-
tims, 67 but may also exist with respect to any witness.68
Second, even when jurors have a considerable pool of experi-
ence relating to a witness' mental or physical condition, that expe-
rience may contain misconceptions or errors that lead to distor-
tions in assessment.6 9 Irrational factors such as discrimination,
prejudice or myth may unduly influence a witness' determination
60. E.g., LOUISIANA Comment, supra note 58, at 723.
61. Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, supra note 57, at 43.
62. These factors were: disguise; weapon visibility; violence; retention interval; mug-
shot search; lineup instructions; lineup size; similarity of lineup members; voice samples;
and witness confidence. Id. at 44-45.
63. Id. at 54.
64. Sanders, Expert Witnesses in Eyewitness Facial Identification Cases, 17 Tax.
TECH L. REv. 1409, 1439 (1986).
65. See Saxe, supra note 55, at 247. On the admissibility of expert testimony to
determine a mentally retarded person's capacity to testify, see People v. Parks, 41 N.Y.2d
36, 48-49, 359 N.E.2d 358, 368, 390 N.Y.S.2d 848, 858 (1976);
66. On rape and the rape trauma syndrome, see State v. Huey, 145 Ariz. 59, 63, 699
P.2d 1290, 1294 (1985); People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 246-251, 681 P.2d 291, 298-
301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 457-60 (1984); State v. Brodniak, 718 P.2d 322 (Mont. 1986).
67. On the jury's difficulties in assessing the credibility of child abuse victims, see
United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417, 420 (8th Cir. 1987); State v. Linsey, 149 Ariz.
472, 475, 720 P.2d 73, 76 (1986); State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 610 (Minn. 1984);
State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 436, 657 P.2d 1215, 1219-20 (1983).
68. See Cutler, Penrod & Stuve, supra note 57, at 54.
69. Common errors are misjudging the base rates of identification, Sanders, supra
note 64, at 1440, and over-estimating the accuracy of eyewitnesses. Id. at 1441. It has been
shown that jurors place great reliance on what are known as indicator variables. Id. at
1443. For example, jurors interpret witness certainty to indicate an accurate identification.
Id. at 1444.
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of truthfulness or accuracy and, in turn, the jurors' assessment of
that witness.70 This second type of deficiency applies to all wit-
nesses, but is perhaps best typified by eyewitness testimony. This
type has been given the most attention by psychologists and is
treated first below.
1. Juror Misconceptions: The Prevalent Deficiency
According to psychological studies, juror misconceptions may
occur at each step of the witness evaluation process.71 This process
is comprised of stages defined by the various testimonial capacities
of a witness, including the cognitive processes of perception,7 2
memory,73 narration and sincerity.74 At the perception stage, the
witness processes various stimuli using her senses of sight, hear-
ing, smell and touch. At the memory stage, the witness stores per-
ceived information and recalls it. Having retrieved the informa-
tion, the witness relates the contents of the memory at the
narration stage.
In assessing credibility, the juror considers whether any de-
fects or deficiencies occurred in the witness' perception, memory
or narration. Finally, the juror considers whether the witness' de-
meanor suggests that the witness is sincere. Misconceptions that
occur at three of these stages - perception, memory and sincerity
- are discussed next.
i. Juror Errors in Evaluating Witness Perception
Psychological studies indicate that juror stereotypes and as-
sumptions about perception differ considerably from the actual
process of perception. This leads to erroneous credibility assess-
ments because jurors are unable to integrate and understand wit-
ness responses accurately. 5
70. Cf. A. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi (1982) (stating that judges believe
"[a]Ilmost all criminal defendants are, in fact, guilty").
71. See infra text accompanying notes 75-123.
72. See infra text accompanying notes 75-89.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 90-111.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 112-123.
75. Factors that affect perception can be grouped into two categories: those inherent
in the event; and those inherent in the observer or witness. E. LoFTus, EYEWITNESS TESTI-
MONY 22 (1979). Factors inherent in the event include the duration of the perception, the
frequency of the perception, the type of facts perceived and the presence of violence in the
event. Id. at 23-32. The length of time during which an observer perceives an event directly
correlates with the accuracy of that perception. Id. at 23; Laughery, Recognition of
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Perception is the total amalgam of sensory signals received
and then processed by an individual at any one time. The psycho-
logical data suggest that many factors affect perception. One sig-
nificant factor is the volume of information to be processed. Per-
ception "is highly selective because the number of signals or
amount of information impinging upon the senses is so great that
the mind can process only a small fraction of the incoming
data. ' 78 The result is an incomplete acquisition of data.7
Another factor influencing perception is that some witnesses
fill in the gaps in their perception .7  Because people are motivated
by the desire to live up to others' expectations and desires, 79 wit-
nesses often compensate for their incomplete acquisition of data
by filling in details based on inferences and personal experiences.8s
The inferences fill in gaps with logical but possibly incorrect infor-
mation.8" Repeated questioning of a witness in the interrogation
process, for example, may produce inconsistent answers because
the witness thinks that his first answer was not satisfactory. This
tendency, however, may well not be common knowledge, and ju-
rors probably fail to take it into account.
Another factor, also counter-intuitive, is that the type of fact
perceived affects the reliability of perception. 2 People tend to
have great difficulty estimating duration, time, speed and dis-
tance.8 3 Moreover, not all errors in perception are consistent. Most
errors involving height and weight, for example, have no predict-
ability. 4 Estimates of duration, however, tend to be too great
Human Faces: Effects of Target Exposure Time, Target Position, Pose Position, and Type
of Photograph, 55 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 477, 480 (1971). The frequency of perception
also corresponds with its accuracy. LOUISIANA Comment, supra note 58, at 727. The more
opportunities the witness had to perceive an event, the more likely that the witness has
perceived it accurately. Id.
76. LOUISIANA Comment, supra note 58, at 723.
77. A person who witnesses a crime, for example, has "one-shot perception," which
is like seeing a single frame of a film. Id. at 724. Thus, the selecting and storing of infor-
mation occurs without an opportunity to stabilize memory. Id.
78. Id. at 721.
79. Id. at 723.
80. Id. at 724.
81. Id. at 724.
82. E. LoFrus, supra note 75, at 27-31.
83. Id.
84. An exception is that such errors do have some predictability if the post-event
suggestions are known. See Christiansen, Ochalek & Sweeney, Influencing Eyewitness De-
scriptions, 7 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 59, 64 (1983).
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rather than too small.8 5
Other factors associated with the observer may significantly
affect the accuracy of perception. These factors include stress
8 7
and personal expectations." While common sense probably makes
jurors somewhat aware of such factors, studies have shown that
these factors may be more important in evaluating credibility than
common sense dictates.8"
ii. Juror Errors in Evaluating Witness Memory
Scientific examination has shown that many aspects of mem-
ory deviate from common-sense or lay experience. Psychological
studies indicate that, contrary to popular belief, "human memory
does not operate like a camera, gathering every detail for later
recall exactly as it was perceived. Rather, it is an active, recon-
structive process in which images are constantly altered through
the integration of new experiences and interpretations." 90 Like
perception, memory is an unconscious process. 91 Jurors may not
know that the unconscious processes of memory - encoding, re-
tention and retrieval - can alter the information originally
85. E. LoFrus, supra note 75, at 31. Another factor found by researchers to be rele-
vant to the accuracy of perception is the presence of violence. Id. When an event does not
contain violence, witnesses to the event apparently provide a more accurate description.
This increased accuracy is attributed to a decreased level of arousal or excitement. Com-
ment, supra note 58, at 728. Furthermore, the accuracy of recalling violent events declines
as the number of perpetrators increases. Id.
86. "The factors which affect the reliability of eyewitness performance operate on
both perception and memory, and are classified according to their source." Comment,
supra note 58, at 725. Factors relating to the observer that pertain to the accuracy of the
identification have been called "witness" factors; factors relating to the subject matter of
the observation have been labeled "event" factors. E. LoFrus, supra note 75, at 32.
87. E. LOFTus, supra note 75, at 33-36.
88. Id. at 36-48. Hunters, for example, who observe and hear movement in a bush
expect that the movement belongs to an animal. Id. at 36-37. People hearing noises in the
dark frequently attribute such noises to evil circumstances.
Psychologists suggest that there are different sources creating the expectations. Id. A
witness may expect certain perceptions based on acculturation or stereotypes, past specific
experiences, personal prejudices or temporary or momentary stimuli. Id.
89. The role of stress, for example, has been studied by psychologists at least since
1908, when researchers Yerkes and Dodson noticed that an increase in emotional arousal
had a negative impact on cognitive performance. E. Lotrus, supra note 75, at 33. The
Yerkes-Dodson law was originally formulated in studies with mice. Numerous other subse-
quent studies with humans indicate that the researchers' original results are applicable to
human behavior as well. Id.





Other juror misconceptions exist. Jurors may misjudge the
witness' memory by not compensating for the witness' expecta-
tions and stereotypes.9 3 Furthermore, the witness may fill in gaps
in memory.94 Perhaps the most popular myth associated with
memory is the belief that memory loss declines in equal incre-
ments through time.95 Psychologists, in classic research dating to
1885,8 suggest that memory loss does not occur gradually but in-
stead occurs more rapidly immediately following the event.97 This
phenomenon, labeled the "forgetting curve," has been tested and
confirmed in numerous studies.9"
The way witnesses use post-event information is also likely to
be foreign to jurors' intuition.9 9 Witnesses often modify their own
recollection of events through post-event discussions. 0' The infor-
mation obtained through the discussions may be added to the orig-
inal memory and alter it. This resulting memory may be slightly
distorted or even totally incorrect. A post-event discussion may,
for example, change the witness' recollection of the level of noise
or violence of an event.'01
Jurors may be unaware that the memory of a witness is
greatly affected by the circumstances surrounding the retrieval of
92. Id.
93. Id. at 726.
94. Witnesses, due to social pressures or other reasons, tend to fill in the gaps of
their memory through speculation about or modification of what they remember. E. LoF-
TUS, supra note 75, at 82-84; Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231 ScI. AM. 23, 27, 28
(Dec. 1974); see infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
In one experiment, for example, a "semi-dramatic" photograph was shown to subjects
of varying backgrounds. In the photograph, a black male and a white male were standing
and conversing. Despite the fact that only the white male was holding a razor, more than
half of the subjects reported that the black man had been holding the razor, and several
described the black man as "brandishing it wildly." LOUISIANA Comment, supra note 58,
at 727; E. LoFrus, supra note 75, at 38. The study concluded that people's expectations
and stereotypes cause them to see and remember what they want to see or remember, even
if the manipulations are not done consciously or in bad faith. E. LoFrus, supra note 75, at
39; LOUISIANA Comment, supra note 58, at 726.
95. See E. LoFrus, supra note 75, at 53 (suggesting that this belief is a myth).
96. H. EBBINGHAUS, MEMORY: A CONTRIBUTION TO EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
(1964); E. Loftus, supra note 75, at 53.
97. E. LOFTUS, supra note 75, at 53.
98. Id.
99. See Christianson, Ochalek & Sweeney, supra note 84, at 64 (concluding that
post-event information affects memory).
100. E. LoFrus, supra note 75, at 54-78.
101. Id. at 70.
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the information. 10 2 Factors such as whether the retrieval is stimu-
lated by questions, who asks the questions, and the way the ques-
tions are asked 03 all may influence the nature of the information
retrieved. 4 Modern scientific techniques, such as the polygraph
test and hypnotism, are affected by the subjectivity of the ques-
tions asked and the power of suggestion. "Free narrative questions
tend to produce more accurate but less complete responses, while
direct, or controlled narrative questions tend to give lower accu-
racy but greater completeness." 0 5 Leading questions or questions
with biased terms "enhance the opportunity for suggestion to fill
gaps or replace poorly remembered details." 06
Jurors may fail to consider that the subject matter of the tes-
timony - such as testimony about an event involving criminal
conduct - can affect memory.107 Studies have shown that the ac-
curacy of memory improves as the seriousness of the crime in-
creases. 0 8 For example, "a witness may have better recall of the
theft of an auto than of the theft of a pencil."' 109 This is because
"the less serious the event, the less attention and energy the wit-
ness is likely to devote to it."" 0
Jurors are also likely to apply the intuitive belief that incon-
sistencies in a witness' testimony indicate that it is inaccurate. Re-
cent studies have shown, however, that there is no correlation be-
tween consistency and accuracy."'
In addition to errors in witness perception and memory, cred-
ibility assessments are affected by some errors in the perception
102. Id. at 89.
103. A. YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 192-96 (1979) (dis-
cussing a 1909 study by Whipple, in which the same question was asked of subjects but in
different forms reflecting various degrees of suggestiveness. The study demonstrated that
the responses to the questions decreased in accuracy as suggestiveness increased.).
104. E. LoI'us, supra note 75, at 108-09.
105. LOUISIANA Comment, supra note 58, at 728.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 727.
108. Id. at 728.
109. Id.
110. Id. The age of the witness can also affect his memory. Studies with mock jurors
have suggested that elderly witnesses are substantially more likely to misidentify a subject
than younger witnesses. Yarmey, Age As a Factor in Eyewitness Memory, in EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY 142, 152-53 (1984) (discussing Yarmey & Kent, Eyewitness Identification by
Elderly and Young Adults, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339 (1980) and Yarmey & Rashid,
Eyewitness Identification by Elderly and Young Adults (1981) (unpublished manuscript)).
111. Geiselman & Padilla, Cognitive Interviewing with Child Witnesses, 16 J. PO-
LICE SCI. & ADMIN. (in press Dec. 1988).
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and memory of the jurors. Jurors are expected to listen passively
to, perhaps, days of testimony and numerous witnesses. This task
is made more difficult in jurisdictions where jurors are not permit-
ted to take notes. Under these circumstances, the same defects
that may affect the witnesses' testimony may distort the jurors'
recollection of that testimony.
iii. Juror Errors in Evaluating Witness Sincerity
Psychological studies suggest that the sincerity of a witness is
observable through nonverbal cues. Perhaps the most widely
known and most controversial form of nonverbal evaluation of a
declarant's sincerity is the polygraph or lie detector test. The mod-
ern version of the polygraph, which traces its ancestry back more
than 2,000 years, measures autonomic physiological reactions, in-
cluding heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, and perspiration, of
a subject who has been asked a series of questions.112 Differences
in measurements are supposed to demonstrate whether the witness
is truthful. Indeed, "[c]ontemporary lie-detection literature sug-
gests that within certain specified limits physiological measures of
deception do have scientific support." 113
Other, more visible, nonverbal clues to sincerity exist in the
form of a witness' demeanor. 1 4 A 1971 study indicates, for exam-
ple, that deceit is generally associated with rigid posture and re-
laxed facial expressions.1 15 Other experiments suggest that lying
witnesses move their hands less, speak with higher pitched voices,
and, even though they may control their facial expression, may
reveal their deceit through foot and leg movements. 1 6 Given the
complexity and subtlety of these nonverbal cues, an untrained ob-
server, such as a juror, has "probably . . . no better than
chance"11 7 to assess accurately sincerity from nonverbal action.
Psychologists suggest that common misconceptions may fur-
ther distort lay assessments of sincerity. The belief that a witness'
confidence in her identification correlates with the reliability of
the identification is perhaps the most glaring of these misconcep-
112. A. YARMEY, supra note 103, at 171.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 168.
115. Id. at 169 (referring to a 1971 study by Mehrabian).
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tions.118 This mistaken correlation often has a strong impact in
eyewitness identification cases and is implicit in many jury in-
structions on eyewitness identification.' 9
Psychologists,' 20  as well as philosophers,' 2 ' have also ex-
amined the morality of lying and deception. Lying, particularly in
the form of social "white lies," is perceived in our country as com-
mon, according to one study. 22 Such moral distinctions affect
each juror's evaluations of sincerity, and can lead to distortions if
the morality of the evaluating juror differs from that of the evalu-
ated witness. 23
2. Absence of Juror Experience
In many instances, juror error in using common sense is
caused not so much by misconceptions about witness perception,
memory and sincerity or defects in their own perception and mem-
ory, but by a lack of the background experience necessary to re-
solve the type of credibility question presented. 24 Many jurors,
for example, may lack experience with which to assess the credi-
bility of witnesses who suffer from mental retardation or mental
illness. Others may have no experience of criminal acts or violent
conduct. Familiarity gained through the media is not an adequate
substitute for actual experience, because media images are sec-
ond-hand images.
118. Convis, Testifying About Testimony: Psychological Evidence on Perceptual
and Memory Factors Affecting the Credibility of Testimony, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 579, 584,
588 n. 43 (1983) (Because jurors are instructed to weigh the evidence as they see fit, their
misguided assumption that confidence reflects accuracy is never corrected.); Deffenbacher,
Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence, 4 LAW & HuM. BEHAV. 243 (1980) (Both judge and
jury rely on witness confidence to demonstrate accuracy.).
119. See Cutler, Penrod & Martens, The Reliability of Eyewitness Identification.:
The Role of System and Estimator Variables, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 234 (1987).
On the recent experimental literature that questions whether a meaningful or useful corre-
lation exists between the accuracy of the prior description and of the subsequent identifica-
tion, see Wells, Verbal Descriptions of Faces From Memory: Are They Diagnostic of Iden-
tification Accuracy, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 619 (1985).
120. A. YARMEY, supra note 103, at 214 (discussing Kintz's 1977 study).
121. See S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978) (for
an insightful analysis of lying and deception in different contexts).
122. See YARMEY, supra note 103, at 214 (discussing Kintz).
123. See supra section I.C.I., pp. 176-77 (discussing how jurors may make credibil-
ity evaluations by making analogies to their own experience).
124. See YARMEY, supra note 103 at 215 (Kolhberg asserts that there are three ba-
sic levels of moral orientation: premoral, conventional role conformity, and self-accepted




Even if some jurors have the requisite experience, the jury as
a whole may arguably lack a commonality of values and stan-
dards. The idea that community members share common values
may have been valid in an era when communities were small and
self-contained. In the modern era, however, with transient popula-
tions and fewer geographical limits to define communities, the no-
tion of a group of people defined by their community is rapidly
becoming illusory. Today, cities melt into suburbs which melt into
rural areas. Moreover, the increase in occupational specialization
has narrowed the diversity of experience of many people and fur-
ther diminished their commonality of understanding.
B. The Implications of the Psychological Critique to the
Application of Jury Common Sense
The results of the psychological studies call into question the
judicial system's reliance on common sense to assess the credibil-
ity of witnesses. Simply put, the studies systematically and effec-
tively expose the notion of common sense as a myth. They reveal
that lay persons rely on misconceptions and erroneous assumptions
in assessing the credibility of others. These myths and misinter-
pretations are embodied in the concept of common sense and ar-
guably not only permit, but also facilitate, erroneous assessments
of credibility. If jurors must be selected from a cross-section of the
community, the empirical data suggest that jurors could reach
more accurate credibility evaluations if they were informed about
the myths and misconceptions associated with common sense.
The conclusions drawn by this psychological critique rock the
foundations of the jury system. Since jurors are, in effect, observ-
ing the re-creation of an act or dispute, defects in the ability of
the jury to evaluate witnesses could easily undermine accurate or
even acceptable juror decision-making. The significance of such
conclusions lies in the potential for a psychologically designed re-
ordering of the jury system. As one commentator remarked:
Psychologists established a prima facie case at least for recogni-
tion by lawyers that they can contribute to the study of eviden-
tiary and procedural problems. By proper development and use
of the experimental methods of psychology we may well be able
to construct a law of evidence more closely related to known
facts of human behaviour. 25
125. Greer, supra note 14, at 152.
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The case for using psychologists at trial to expose the imper-
fections in jurors' common-sense analysis is strengthened by the
observation that participating lawyers apparently cannot correct
the flaws in the jury's analysis. This is because lawyers themselves
lack expertise in the area and suffer from the same defects in intu-
ition that jurors do. Thus, they cannot effectively expose the
myths and prejudices on cross-examination. Furthermore, even if
attorneys became aware of such imperfections and attempted to
expose them, jurors would be skeptical of any argument that is
counter-intuitive; re-educating is better done by an expert. Addi-
tionally, special jury instructions would probably not help, since
studies have shown that many jury instructions are ineffective.12
The courts have been assessing and evaluating the admissibil-
ity of psychological evidence regarding credibility assessment. The
way in which the courts evaluate psychological data has the po-
tential for redefining the role of the jury during trial, as well as
the role of psychology in the courtroom.
III. THE COURTS' RESPONSE TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
CRITIQUE
The courts' approaches to the admissibility of psychological
evidence on credibility illustrate the conflict between the empirical
and the common-sense approaches to credibility. This section will
explore the largely unsuccessful efforts of courts to alleviate the
tension by devising various rules and principles.
The common-sense approach to credibility still maintains a
strong grip on most courts. In the large majority of cases, courts
have defended the exercise of jury common sense and excluded
expert testimony or special jury instructions when offered at trial
and these exclusions have generally been sustained on appeal. 27
In a few jurisdictions, however, the insights provided by the em-
pirical data and the occurrence of inaccurate lay assessments of
credibility resulting in erroneous verdicts have led courts to permit
such testimony 2 " or special jury instructions'29 designed to ac-
complish the same purpose.
The common-sense evaluations that have come under attack
are primarily those involving child sexual and physical abuse and
126. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
127. See Loftus & Schneider, supra note 18, at 4.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 172-223 and 230-38.
129. See infra text accompanying notes 224-229.
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eyewitness identification. Yet the considerations relied on by
courts in evaluating the sufficiency of common sense credibility
assessments are independent of the nature of these cases. Themes
such as redundancy,130 centrality,31 generality, 32 and prejudice1 33
transcend the boundaries of subject matter and apply to all wit-
nesses who rely on their perception and memory to testify or
whose sincerity must be evaluated by the jury.
A. The Applicable Rules of Evidence
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: "[i]f scientific, techni-
cal, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or other-
wise."'134 Many states have an identical or substantially similar
rule on the admissibility of expert witness testimony. 3 5
The rule is broadly framed to favor the admissibility of testi-
mony that may assist the jury. The Advisory Committee stated:
"[w]hether the situation is a proper one for the use of expert testi-
mony is to be determined on the basis of assisting the trier."'3 6 In
Wigmore's words, the appropriate question asked under this rule
is "on this subject can a jury from this person receive appreciable
help?' 37 When opinions are excluded, it is because they are un-
helpful and therefore superfluous and a waste of time.' 8 Another
commentator has explained the rule thus:
There is no more certain test for determining when experts may
be used than the common sense inquiry whether the untrained
layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the
130. See infra text accompanying notes 144-155.
131. See infra text accompanying notes 230-238.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 187-216.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 156-171.
134. FED. R. EvID. 702.
135. Twenty-seven states adopted Federal Rule 702 verbatim. These states are
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin and Wyoming. Four other states - Florida, Michigan, Nevada and North Car-
olina - have adopted the federal rule with minor changes. 2 G. JOSEPH & S. SALTZBURG,
EVIDENCE IN AMERICA: THE FEDERAL RULES IN THE STATES § 51.2 (1988).
136. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
137. 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 1923.
138. Id. at § 1918.
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best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment
from those having a specialized understanding of the subject in-
volved in the dispute. 9
Even if the evidence meets the broad standard of Rule 702,
however, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and comparable state
rules require additional prerequisites to admissibility: "[a]lthough
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence."' 140 Expert testimony may create a "battle of the experts,"
or in balance not be worth the time devoted to it. 4 ' If expert testi-
mony is irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial or if it runs foul of any
other of the 403 criteria, a judge will not admit it in evidence. 42
The balancing of the need to assist the jury against the dan-
ger of unfair prejudice and other considerations has proven to be
central to most courts' decisions about the admissibility of expert
testimony. 43 Appellate courts that have articulated rationales for
admitting or excluding psychological evidence invariably have em-
139. Ladd, Expert Testimony, 5 VAND. L. REV. 414, 418 (1952) (emphasis added).
140. FED. R. EvID. 403. E.g., United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir.
1986); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1243 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 383 (lst Cir. 1979); United States v. Scavo, 593 F.2d 837, 844 (8th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Green, 548 F.2d 1261, 1268 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Collins, 395 F. Supp. 629,
636 (M.D. Pa. 1975); State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 605, 645 P.2d 1330, 1336 (1982).
Under the federal "substantially outweighed" standard, the balance between prejudice
and probative value is generally to be struck in favor of admissibility. D. LoUISELL & C.
MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 382 (1979); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER. WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE 702[02], at 702-30 (1988); see also Loftus & Schneider, supra note 18, at 16
(applying the 403 test to the subject of eyewitness testimony).
141. See Convis, supra note 118, at 582.
142. E.g., State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 382, 728 P.2d 248, 252 (1986) ("We see
no reason to risk influencing the jury's credibility determination by allowing expert opinion
testimony on a witness's [sic] believability.").
The trial judge has broad discretion to determine the admissibility of testimony. E.g.,
Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962); United States v. Langford, 802
F.2d 1176, 1179 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1008 (1987); United States v.
Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339-40 (8th Cir. 1986); State v. Tafoya, 94 N.M. 762, 764, 617 P.2d
151, 153 (1980); 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 140, T 702[02], at 702-22.
The standard of appellate review of a trial judge's decision on the admissibility of
expert psychological testimony is "abuse of discretion or manifest error." United States v.
Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1985). If expert testimony is erroneously admitted, it
only constitutes reversible error if "the admission more probably than not materially af-
fected the verdict." Id. at 601-02.
143. This analysis applies to jury instructions as well.
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phasized either the testimony's helpfulness or one or more of the
countervailing concerns listed in Rule 403.
B. The Courts' Approach to Excluding Expert Psychological
Testimony - Exposition and Analysis
Courts considering the admissibility of special assistance to
the jury on credibility questions generally base their decision on
either the relevance or prejudicial impact of such assistance. Re-
gardless of whether a court has admitted or excluded such assis-
tance, this section demonstrates that the court's analysis in this
area is indeterminate.
1. Relevancy
Some courts exclude psychological testimony on the ground
that it is irrelevant and fails to assist the jury in evaluating the
credibility of witnesses. These courts see such testimony as "need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence."144 In particular, these
courts generally focus on either the redundancy of the data vis-A-
vis the jury's common sense or the existence of traditional meth-
ods of assistance, such as cross-examination and the opportunity
to observe witness demeanor.
i. The Redundancy of the Evidence: Duplicating the Jury's
Common Sense
Many courts exclude testimony or special instructions about
witness credibility because it merely duplicates the jury function
of judging the facts of the case. These courts conclude that the
testimony is cumulative because, in most cases, the common expe-
rience of the jury should suffice as a basis for assessments of credi-
bility.145 Both expert testimony and jury instructions are believed
to "muddy the waters"'14 6 by providing information that the jurors
already possess.147
In United States v. Affleck, 148 the defendant was charged
144. FED. R. EvID. 403.
145. In excluding expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitnesses, the court in
United States v. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013
(1987), noted that the expert "acknowledged that many of his conclusions coincided with
common sense."
146. Id.
147. See supra note I I and accompanying text.
148. 776 F.2d 1451 (10th Cir. 1985).
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with and convicted of securities, interstate commerce, and bank-
ruptcy fraud. During trial, the defendant offered a "memory ex-
pert" to explain "how well or how poorly people are able to re-
member events over the course of time and why they remember
things the way that they do."' 49 The trial court excluded the testi-
mony and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the exclu-
sion. The appellate court reasoned that the average person under-
stands that people forget things. 5 ' The court also noted that
cross-examination can elicit defects in memory.' 5 '
Interestingly, this redundancy analysis generally deals with
the psychological studies by ignoring them. The mere assertion of
the sufficiency of common sense does not, however, refute the
studies or their conclusions. It merely preserves, without specific
justification, the traditional roles of expert and jury. While guid-
ance on matters of common sense may be repugnant to the tradi-
tional roles of jury and experts, tradition alone does not negate the
value of the psychological data.
ii. The Presence of Alternative Safeguards
In a number of jurisdictions, courts have excluded special as-
sistance for credibility assessments because of a different type of
redundancy: the existence of alternative safeguards. These safe-
guards, including cross-examination and the jury's ability to ob-
serve witness demeanor, purportedly render expert testimony and
special jury instructions superfluous.' 52 In Commonwealth v.
Francis,'53 for example, the defendant was tried on charges of
armed robbery and assault and battery with a dangerous weapon.
At trial, the evidence included the testimony of two eyewitnesses.
The defendant was not permitted to offer the testimony of an ex-
pert on eyewitness reliability. The defendant was convicted and he
appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts stated that like most appellate courts, it did not view expert
testimony as a "standard safeguard" against potential misidentifi-
cations.154 Instead, it concluded that safeguards such as cross-ex-
149. Id. at 1458.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. E.g., United States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
831 (1986); Johnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051
(1984); Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 453 N.E.2d 1204 (1983).
153. 390 Mass. 89, 453 N.E.2d 1204 (Mass. 1983).
154. Id. at 100, 453 N.E.2d at 1210.
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amination, closing argument, and regular jury instructions would
provide more than adequate protection as a general rule.155 Courts
that subscribe to this "equivalent safeguards" analysis conclude
that cross-examination, when combined with other traditional
safeguards, completely satisfies the jury's need for information
upon which to base credibility assessments.
The "sufficiency of safeguards" analysis, while superficially
appealing, is misguided. In rejecting the testimony on these
grounds, courts do not view the purported assistance as advancing
the evaluation process but rather as an additional source of infor-
mation that the jurors have already. The courts fail to recognize,
however, that the expert's empirical data examines the evaluation
process itself. The purpose of the data is to assist jurors in or-
ganizing the raw credibility information they derive from the
traditional safeguards such as cross-examination, attorney argu-
ments, and witness demeanor.
Attorneys and judges cannot effectively provide this organiza-
tional assistance because they are not familiar enough with the
psychological data to communicate it to the jury properly. The
task is better left to an expert who deals regularly with the data
and is better able to explain it to the jury, particularly with re-
spect to its counter-intuitive components.
2. Prejudice
While empirically assisted determinations of credibility have
often been rejected on the ground that special assistance from ex-
perts or jury instructions provides no appreciable help, the most
prevalent ground of exclusion has been the prejudicial impact of
the psychological testimony. 56 If a court deems that expert testi-
155. As the court indicated:
[A]s the trial of this case demonstrates, .... [t]he jury has the opportunity to
assess the witnesses' credibility on the basis of what is presented at trial and not
solely on general principles. The case has not been made that the introduction of
the testimony of Dr. Loftus would have assisted the jury in their difficult task.
Id. at 101, 453 N.E.2d at 1210; see also United States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841, 843 (9th
Cir.) ("We have observed that cross-examination should be effective to expose any incon-
sistencies or deficiencies in eyewitness identification.") (citing United States v. Amaral,
488 F.2d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1973)), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 831 (1986); State v. Wooden,
658 S.W.2d 553, 557 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1983).
156. Several different types of prejudice exist. In United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d
1148 (9th Cir. 1973), the court presented four criteria for the admissibility of expert wit-
nesses: (1) the witness must be a qualified expert; (2) the testimony must be based on a
generally accepted scientific explanatory theory; (3) the subject matter must be proper; and
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mony on eyewitness identification, for example, is based on an un-
reliable area of study, or that the jury is likely to give it dispropor-
tionate weight, the court will refuse to admit it on the ground that
its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. 5'
Some courts have also been concerned that such testimony could
prove costly, prolong a trial, and still mislead the jury by present-
ing "extraneous information having an aura of scientific
credibility."' 158
i. The Unreliability of the Psychological Evidence
The reliability of scientific evidence provides the threshold
prejudice inquiry in determining its admissibility. Some judges re-
ject testimony about witness credibility because the techniques
used to derive the psychological conclusions about credibility may
be insufficiently reliable. They reason that admission of unreliable
conclusions would be unfairly prejudicial because it might mislead
the jury, which is unlikely to fully appreciate its defects.
Courts that exclude psychological data on unreliability
grounds usually apply the test advanced in the seminal case of
Frye v. United States.159 Frye concerned the admissibility of sys-
tolic blood pressure deception (polygraph) test results, but its rule
has been extended to all forms of novel scientific evidence. 60 In
(4) the probative value must outweigh the testimony's prejudicial effect. Id. at 1153. While
criterion (3) essentially requires that the testimony assist the jury, criteria (2) and (4)
provide different prejudice tests.
The court in United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381, 382-83 (1st Cir. 1979), focused
only on the latter three criteria. It required that the testimony be relevant to a fact in issue,
able to assist the jury's common understanding, and the result of a reliable scientific analy-
sis. Id. Under the test advanced in the seminal case of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013,
1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923), evidence based on a new scientific method of proof is only admissi-
ble if such evidence is shown to be generally accepted as reliable in the scientific commu-
nity in which it was developed. See infra text accompanying notes 159-162. While criterion
(1) concerning a witness's qualifications has not been a significant factor in deciding admis-
sibility, criteria (2) and (4) have been considered by courts fairly frequently.
157. See FED. R. EvID. 403.
158. Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 101 n.8, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 n.8
(1983); see also State v. Lewisohn, 379 A.2d 1192, 1203-04 (Me. 1977) (Expert testimony
on the reliability of infact witnesses would only divert the jury from the true issues of the
case.); State v. Stucke, 419 So. 2d 939, 945 (La. 1982) (The prejudicial effect of expert
testimony on witness credibility outweighs its probative value and usurps the jury
function.).
159. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
160. E.g., United States v. Watson, 587 F.2d 365, 369 (7th Cir. 1978) (expert testi-




Frye, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that
testimony based on novel scientific discoveries may be introduced
if the "scientific principle or discovery. . . from which the deduc-
tion is made [is] sufficiently established to have gained acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs."'' In subsequent appli-
cations of this rigorous standard, courts have rejected expert testi-
mony in many novel areas, including witness credibility, for fail-
ing to possess the requisite scientific reliability.'62
The problems with the Frye test are numerous.1 3 Its inflexi-
bility, for example, forecloses the introduction of potentially valu-
able information simply because it is new and not yet widely ac-
cepted in the scientific community. 6 4  Thus, while the Frye
standard may assure reliability, it also sometimes prevents impor-
tant and worthwhile evidence from reaching the jury by failing to
take into account special circumstances.
ii. Jury Over-Reliance on the Psychological Data
Courts have also excluded expert testimony about credibility
as unfairly prejudicial on the ground that the jury will accord it
exaggerated importance. The expert would usurp the role of the
jury by substituting the conclusions of the expert for the indepen-
dent conclusions drawn by the lay jurors. 65 Arguably, this trans-
161. Frye, 293 F. at 1014; see United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1107 (6th Cir.
1984) (Expert testimony must "conform to a generally accepted explanatory theory" to be
admissible and that on eyewitness identification it does.).
162. E.g., United States v. Jackson, 16 Crim. L. 2507 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1975) (Eye-
witness identification is not yet a generally recognized field of psychological study.); see
also United States v. Wilson, 361 F. Supp. 510, 514 (D. Md. 1973) (noting that the "uni-
queness of the human psyche" weakens the scientific status of the behavioral sciences as
compared to the physical sciences).
Other courts have been less harsh and concluded that the reliability of scientific analy-
sis concerning eyewitness identification, a novel area of study, has progressed to the point
that its "day may have arrived." Smith, 736 F.2d at 1107 (concerning expert testimony on
eyewitness perceptions in stressful situations). One court has even posited that "[tihe scien-
tific validity of the studies confirming the many weaknesses of eyewitness identification
cannot be seriously questioned at this point." United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312
(5th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
163. See Imwinkelreid, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique
from the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL L. REV. 554, 557-60 (1982); Im-
winkelreid, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence: A Primer on Evaluating
The Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261 (1981).
164. See M. GRAHAM, FLORIDA HANDBOOK ON EVIDENCE, 546-54 (1987) (The Frye
test "by its conservative nature depriv[es] the trier of fact of relevant, usually newly discov-
ered, scientific evidence.").
165. United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 340 (8th Cir. 1986) ("putting an impres-
1989-901
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
fer of decision-making is institutionally improper. Furthermore, it
is more likely to occur as the expert's testimony approaches the
ultimate issues that the jury must decide.16 6 The jury may overes-
timate the value of the testimony for several reasons. The jury
may simply defer to the expert's judgment because of her qualifi-
cations and stature. The jury may adopt the expert's conclusions
because she already has performed the work of thinking through
the problem.
Unfair prejudice may also arise when jurors assume that ex-
perts will adopt a bipartisan, objective stance in educating them
about their area of expertise. Experts, however, may cross the line
between educator and advocate1 17 and jurors may not realize or
believe that the expert is advocating, rather than simply educat-
ing. 68 If a jury cannot distinguish between the two roles an expert
sively qualified expert's stamp of truthfulness on a witness's story goes too far"); United
States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (expert scientific evidence "may in
some circumstances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of lay-
men."); United States v. Barnard, 490 F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973) (receiving expert
testimony on credibility "may cause juries to surrender their own common sense in weight-
ing testimony); Washington v. Unites States, 390 F.2d 444, 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("It has
often been argued that in guise of an expert, the psychiatrist becomes the thirteenth juror
and unfortunately the most important one."); Commonwealth v. O'Searo, 466 Pa. 224,
228-29, 352 A.2d 30, 32 (1976) ("To permit psychological testimony . . . would be an
invitation for the trier of fact to abdicate its responsibility to ascertain the facts relying
upon the questionable promise that the expert is in a better position to make such a
judgment.").
166. See Loftus & Schneider, supra note 18.
167. Ironically, experts may tend to reinforce juror decisions when weak and strong
identification circumstances exist. When weak circumstances exist, the expert reinforces
the lack of identification, and vice versa. This result, of course, is not always beneficial or
fair for a criminal defendant.
168. State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Iowa 1986) ("[E]xpert opinions on the
truthfulness of a witness should generally be excluded because weighing the truthfulness of
a witness is a matter reserved exclusively to the fact finder."); Commonwealth v. O'Searo,
466 Pa. at 229, 352 A.2d at 32 (To permit the testimony to be admitted "for this purpose
would be an invitation for the trier of fact to abdicate its responsibility .... ").
Like expert testimony on the reliability of specific eyewitness identifications, expert
testimony about the veracity of the particular child complainant in a sexual abuse case is
generally inadmissible. Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1387-88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1986) (Expert testimony that goes directly to the truthfulness of child sexual abuse victim
is inadmissible.); Note, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony In Intrafamily Child Sex-
ual Abuse Cases, 34 UCLA L. REV. 175, 204 (1986) (even where expert testimony regard-
ing sexually abused child syndrome in general is admitted, expert opinion on truthfulness
of child's testimony is inadmissible). But see State v. Kim, 64 Haw. 598, 602-10, 645 P.2d
1330, 1334-39 (1982) (child psychiatrist's opinion about believability of complainant in
rape case admissible).
Even testimony that only indirectly impeaches the credibility of the complaining wit-
ness in sexual abuse cases, particularly those involving adult victims, is often not permitted.
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can play, ethical constraints on the expert and cross-examination
provide the only safeguards against misleading the jury.
iii. Confusing the Jury
Finally, courts have excluded expert testimony about credibil-
ity on the ground that it confuses rather than clarifies the issues at
trial.169 This is most likely to occur when opposing parties each
present their own experts. Such a "battle of the experts" requires
jurors to decide which of the expert witnesses is more credible.1"'
Paradoxically, the jurors must then decide which expert to believe,
while the experts are testifying about how to determine the believ-
ability of other witnesses.
iv. Evaluating the Prejudice Analysis
Despite the reliance on various forms of prejudice as a basis
for excluding expert testimony about credibility, several weak-
nesses are apparent in using these rationales for excluding psycho-
logical testimony. First, in light of the policy favoring the admissi-
bility of expert testimony helpful to the jury, the mere possibility
of abuse should not foreclose its use, but instead suggests that a
case-by-case assessment is preferable.17 1 In addition, the potential
See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450,
460 (1984) (Rape trauma syndrome evidence is unreliable and consequently inadmissible.);
State v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 654, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982) (expert testimony on
"rape trauma syndrome" admissible to show that a forcible assault occurred); State v.
Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227, 230-31 (Minn. 1982) (Expert testimony on the rape trauma
syndrome is inadmissible because it is not more reliable than the common sense of the
jury.); State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Mo. 1984) (Expert testimony on rape trauma
syndrome erroneously admitted because the testimony constituted an implied opinion on
the credibility of the complainant which could mislead the jury.); see also United States v.
Binder, 769 F.2d 595, 602 (9th Cir. 1985) (concluding that the effect of expert testimony
on the believability of children in a sexual child molestation case is to "improperly but-
tress" the credibility of the complaining witness).
169. E.g., United States v. Ramirez, 871 F.2d 582, 585 (6th Cir. 1989) (allowing
each side to present experts regarding a witness' credibility would raise even more issues
for the jury).
170. See, e.g., Garner v. Santoro, 865 F.2d 629, 645 (5th Cir. 1989) ("Thus, we
have a 'battle of the experts,' and the jury 'must be allowed to make credibility determina-
tions and weigh the conflicting evidence in order to decide the likely truth of a matter not
itself initially resolvable by common knowledge or lay reasoning.' ") (quoting Osburn v.
Anchor Labs., 825 F.2d 809 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1476 (1988)).
171. Courts sometimes decide difficult questions, such as the admissibility of empiri-
cal data on credibility assessments, by focusing on procedural limitations. The Federal
Rules of Evidence, however, favor admissibility over exclusion of helpful expert testimony.
FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note. Moreover, it is well-established that the trial
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for substitution of judgment, obfuscation and over-reliance on the
testimony can be guarded against through special cautionary in-
structions by the court. Finally, the potential for prejudice arises
with all kinds of expert testimony and yet courts regularly admit
such evidence. The potential for prejudice should be no more of an
obstacle to the admission of expert testimony on credibility than it
is to the admission of other forms of expert testimony.
C. Courts' Rationales for Admitting Expert Psychological
Testimony
A growing minority of federal and state courts have con-
cluded that expert psychological testimony does satisfy the help-
fulness and prejudice standards of admissibility.172 While some
appellate courts have held that the exclusion of expert psychologi-
cal testimony under certain circumstances is reversible error, most
appellate courts commit the question firmly to the trial court's
discretion.
1. The Testimony is Helpful
Courts that have admitted expert testimony on credibility
have found that the testimony meets the assistance requirement
because "[i]t is not required that a question be unanswerable by
the trier of fact before [such testimony] can be admitted, but only
that it will be of assistance."1 '' This approach reflects a principle
of "partial assistance" and is consistent with the notion that the
jury must still evaluate, organize and weigh the raw credibility
information on even the most common of questions. Under this
approach, the purpose of credibility testimony is to facilitate these
jury tasks.
judge has broad discretion in admitting or excluding expert testimony. E.g., United States
V. Serna, 799 F.2d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013 (1987). When the
issue of admissibility is debatable, the trial judge's decision will prevail. E.g., id.; United
States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701, 705 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 829 (1981);
State v. Lint, 657 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). The standard of review of trial
court decisions to admit or exclude evidence is whether the decision was "clearly errone-
ous." Serna, 799 F.2d at 850. In light of the principles favoring admissibility and allowing
the trial court discretion, one might expect that many courts would be receptive to the
occasional admission of expert testimony on credibility.
172. FED. R. EvIo. 702. See, e.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1231
(3d Cir. 1985); Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 453 N.E.2d. 1204, 1209 (1983).
173. Convis, supra note 118, at 583.
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The analysis of the court in United States v. Moore17 4 is il-
lustrative. In Moore, three defendants were accused of extortion
and conspiracy to commit extortion. There were two eyewitnesses,
but little corroborating circumstantial evidence. The defense of-
fered a psychologist, Dr. Elizabeth Loftus, to testify on the credi-
bility of the eyewitness testimony.175 The trial court excluded the
expert testimony, holding that the evaluation of eyewitnesses was
not an area requiring expert testimony. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision, noting that the decision to admit or
exclude such testimony lies within the discretion of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals explained, however, that the psycholo-
gist's testimony was potentially admissible, because it did not
merely restate common knowledge. 76 The Court found that the
conclusions of psychological studies on eyewitness identification
"are largely counter-intuitive, and serve to 'explode common
myths about an individual's capacity for perception ....
This analysis echoes that of United States v. Smith. 78 In
Smith, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery. Three eye-
witnesses identified the defendant as the perpetrator and the de-
fendant's palm print was found at the scene of the crime. The trial
court rejected an offer of expert testimony on the potential unreli-
ability of eyewitnesses. 79 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the exclusion was error, because the testimony
"might have refuted common assumptions about the reliability of
eyewitness identification."' 0 The Court affirmed the defendant's
conviction, however, finding the error harmless.' 8'
174. 786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986).
175. Dr. Loftus's testimony would have consisted of factors such as: 1. the "forget-
ting curve," which indicates that memory decreases at a geometric rather than an arithme-
tic rate; 2. the "assimilation factor," which shows that witnesses sometimes include inaccu-
rate post-event information in their testimony; 3. the "feedback factor," which describes
how witnesses who discuss the case with other witnesses may reinforce mistaken identifica-
tion; and 4. other psychological theories relating to eyewitness identification. Id. at 1311.
See supra notes 75-116 and accompanying text.
176. The court went further and stated that in certain situations, such as when eye-
witness testimony "may make the entire difference between a finding of guilt or inno-
cence," it may be an abuse of that discretion to exclude expert testimony. Moore, 786 F.2d
at 1313.
177. Id. at 1312 (quoting United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103, 1105 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984)).
178. 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1984).
179. Id. at 1105.
180. Id. at 1106.
181. Id. at 1108.
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Nevertheless, even if it is assumed that the common-sense ap-
proach to evaluating witness credibility contains inaccuracies, the
analyses of Moore and Smith do not resolve the underlying ten-
sion between the law's embrace and the psychologists' rejection of
the concept of common sense. The psychological studies are not in
accord over whether informing jurors about the inaccuracies of
the common sense approach would actually assist the jurors' eval-
uation of particular witnesses at trial."8 2 It is questionable whether
jurors could be educated that quickly, or at all, on matters that
are mostly counter-intuitive. Education would require, first, an un-
learning and, second, a disciplined effort to understand the some-
times complex conclusions drawn by the experts. Thus, the narrow
question of whether such expert testimony assists the jury remains
unanswered. It is still not obvious that there is a direct causal re-
lationship between communicating to jurors the conclusions drawn
from the empirical studies and improved juror accuracy in assess-
ing credibility. 83
2. The Testimony is Not Unfairly Prejudicial
Some courts have concluded that expert psychological testi-
mony assists the jury and is not unfairly prejudicial. These courts
have used several methods to reduce the prejudicial impact of psy-
chological testimony before admitting it. These methods include
limiting the subject areas of the testimony,8 modifying the test
of reliability, 85 and using jury instructions instead of experts.8 6
i. The Form of the Testimony: Specific Versus General
a. Specific Testimony
In determining whether psychological testimony is unfairly
182. Compare McCloskey & Egeth, Eyewitness Identification: What Can a Psychol-
ogist Tell a Jury?, 1985 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 550, 556 (concluding that jurors who have the
benefit of expert psychological testimony do not improve the accuracy of their evaluations
of eyewitness identification testimony) with Cutler, Dexter & Penrod, The Eyewitness, the
Expert Psychologist and the Jury, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 311, 329 (1989) [hereinafter
Cutler, Dexter & Penrod, The Eyewitness] (demonstrating that expert testimony does im-
prove jurors' judgment).
183. Ironically, unless a judge relies on a psychological study to exclude empirical
data about credibility assessments, the judge uses her own intuition about the sufficiency of
the jury's common sense.
184. See infra text and accompanying notes 187-217.
185. See infra text accompanying notes 218-223.
186. See infra text accompanying notes 224-229.
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prejudicial, many courts have based their conclusion largely on
the form of the testimony. Expert testimony that refers specifi-
cally to other witnesses in the case is rarely permitted. 87 In Ore-
gon, for example, "a witness, expert or otherwise, may not give an
opinion on whether he believes a witness is telling the truth. [Ore-
gon] reject[s] testimony from a witness about the credibility of
another witness, although [it] recognize[s] some jurisdictions ac-
cept it."'1 8 On the other hand, in People v. Cowles,l89 the Michi-
gan Supreme Court admitted testimony by medical experts about
the rape victim's credibility. The Court held that it was proper for
the experts to testify that the victim was a "pathological falsi-
fier."1 0 In so doing, the Court expressly accepted that the testi-
mony was relevant "not in extenuation of rape, but for its bearing
upon the question of the weight to be accorded the testimony of
the [victim]."19'
b. General Testimony
The most commonly admitted form of expert testimony on
credibility concerns the common or general characteristics of a
group of people."l 2 Courts have found this form of testimony to
have the least prejudicial impact.'93 The testimony usually in-
structs jurors on how to assess properly the credibility of a certain
type of witness or explains that certain behavior is relatively nor-
mal.8 Such testimony still affects indirectly the credibility of in-
dividual witnesses, but as one judge stated, "[s]ome bolstering of
187. But see Jeffers v. State, 145 Ga. 74, 78, 88 S.E. 571, 573 (1916); Convis, supra
note 118 (survey of the early usage of expert testimony based on psychological factors).
188. State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 438, 657 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1983) (footnote
omitted).
189. 246 Mich. 429, 224 N.W. 387 (1929).
190. Id. at 431, 224 N.W. at 388.
191. Id.
192. In Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215, the defendant had allegedly raped
his fourteen year-old daughter. At trial, a juvenile counselor/social worker was permitted
to testify that the fourteen-year-old's behavior was characteristic of sexual abuse victims.
The counselor stated, among other things, that the child had acted "very much in keeping
with children who have complained of sex [sic] molestation at home." Id. at 432 n.5, 657
P.2d at 1218 n.5. On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the admission of the ex-
pert's testimony, concluding that it provided "information the jury did not have" and that
would allow a more accurate determination of credibility. Id. at 435-36, 657 P.2d at 1219-
20.
193. E.g., Kruse v. State, 483 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (permit-
ting expert testimony on behavior patterns of child assault victims).
194. Id.
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a party's credibility cannot be helped. 195
The admission of general credibility testimony occurs most
often in cases involving sexual abuse and child witnesses.' 9 In
State v. Myers,19 7 the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the ad-
mission of expert psychological testimony about the typical symp-
toms of sexually abused children.'98 In Myers, a clinical psycholo-
gist with vast professional experience in cases involving sexually
abused children testified about some general characteristics of
those children.' 99 In upholding the admission of this testimony,
the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that the "emotional and
psychological characteristics observed in sexually abused children
[are] a proper subject of expert testimony,"' 0 because they pro-
vide "a relevant insight into the puzzling aspects of the child's
conduct and demeanor which the jury could not otherwise bring to
its evaluation of her credibility . *. . .1,2 The child's young age
appeared to be important to the admissibility of the expert's
information. 0 2
General expert testimony about other widely disparate as-
pects of sex crimes cases has been permitted. One court allowed
testimony on the frequency of delays in reporting incidents of
child sexual abuse.203 Other courts have permitted testimony
about different mental and psychological symptoms of sexually
195. Id. at 1388.
196. See, e.g., People v. Roscoe, 168 Cal. App. 3d 1093, 215 Cal. Rptr. 45 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1985) (permitting expert testimony about the class of molestation victims being reluc-
tant to talk to investigators); see also People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 247, 681 P.2d 291,
298, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 457-58, (1984) (citing cases that have admitted such testimony).
197. 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1984).
198. Id. But see State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 293-94, 667 P.2d 96, 99-100
(1983) (expressing disapproval of the use of expert testimony "as substantive evidence to
help persuade the jury that [defendant] was guilty").
199. The victim was a seven-year-old girl. Myers, 359 N.W.2d at 606. The psycholo-
gist, Dr. Clare Bell, had sixty sexual abuse cases at the time of trial. Id. at 608. The
general characteristics she referred to included fear of men, nightmares about attacks, and
conduct in which "the child looks and acts older than she is." Id. at 608-09.
200. Id. at 609.
201. Id. at 610.
202. Id. at 610 (distinguishing jury's need for background data on child victims of
sexual abuse from that for adult rape victims); see also State v. Carlson, 360 N.W.2d 442
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (in which the court permitted expert testimony in a child abuse
case involving children ages eight and ten). For a different conclusion regarding the admis-
sibility of expert testimony when the victim is age seventeen, see State v. Danielski, 350
N.W.2d 395 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
203. State v. Petrich, 101 Wash. 2d 566, 576, 683 P.2d 173, 180 (1984).
202 [Vol. 40:165
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abused children." 4 In State v. Kim, °5 the Supreme Court of Ha-
waii affirmed the admission of expert testimony in a case in which
the defendant was accused of having sexual intercourse with his
thirteen-year-old step-daughter. Dr. Eberhard Mann, a pediatri-
cian and child psychiatrist, testified about the likelihood of the
victim's having fantasized the sexual acts, among other things.0 6
The court found that the expert offered the jurors information
about "specific" and "comprehensible" characteristics not other-
wise available to them.20 7
Often, the expert testifying about common behavioral re-
sponses to physical or sexual abuse frames the testimony in terms
of clinical "syndromes." These syndromes include the battered
woman's syndrome,08 the rape trauma syndrome,20 9 the battered
child syndrome,210 and the sexually abused child syndrome.211
This type of testimony also relates circumstantially to the credibil-
ity of witnesses. The expert testifies about an empirically based
psychological state and behavior, caused by crimes such as sexual
abuse or rape.212 The exposition of these syndromes corroborates
the victim's claims by expressly or implicitly stating that the vic-
tim's behavior is consistent with the behavior of other such
victims.
It is axiomatic that while general testimony is less prejudicial
than specific testimony about other witnesses, general testimony
also is less probative. The preference for general testimony, how-
ever, appears to reflect a distinction in the Federal Rules of Evi-
204. E.g., State v. Myers, 382 N.W.2d 91, 97 (Iowa 1986) ("[I]t seems that experts
will be allowed to express opinions on matters that explain relevant mental and psychologi-
cal symptoms present in sexually abused children.").
205. 64 Haw. 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982).
206. Id. at 601, 645 P.2d at 1334.
207. Id. at 608, 645 P.2d at 1338.
208. Recent cases admitting testimony about the battered woman's syndrome in-
clude: Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. State,
247 Ga. 612, 617-619 , 277 S.E.2d 678, 682-83 (1981). Not all jurisdictions are permitting
such testimony, however. E.g., State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d
137, 139-40 (1981); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981).
209. E.g., State v. McQuillen, 236 Kan. 161, 171, 689 P.2d 822, 828-29 (1984); State
v. Marks, 231 Kan. 645, 653-55, 647 P.2d 1292, 1299 (1982).
210. Comment, Expert Testimony On Rape Trauma Syndrome: Admissibility and
Effective Use in Criminal Rape Prosecution, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 417, 442 (1984) (Testi-
mony on battered child syndrome admissible as a description of victim's injuries. It is not
unduly prejudicial because it does not identify batterer.).
211. Hicks, supra note 44.
212. See Note, The Unreliability of Expert Testimony on the Typical Characteris-
tics of Sexual Abuse Victims, 74 GEo. LJ. 429, 437 (1985).
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dence, which, arguably, favors evidence with low probative value
and a small prejudicial effect over evidence that is both highly
prejudicial and highly probative.21 3
Some courts, however, find the lower probative value of gen-
eral testimony to be an obstacle to its admissibility. For these
courts, the admission of testimony about the behavioral patterns
of sexual abuse victims is error because it permits an indirect
opinion on the credibility of a witness that would be improper if
offered directly. In State v. Myers,214 for example, the defendant
was convicted in Iowa of indecent contact with an eight-year-old
child. The trial court permitted an expert to testify generally
about the veracity of children who allege sexual abuse. The Iowa
Supreme Court held that the admission of such testimony was an
abuse of discretion and reversed the conviction. 15 The Court
painted a bright line that prohibited indirect testimony about
credibility whenever direct testimony would also be
inadmissible. 1 6
ii. The Scope of Juror Common Sense
A different approach to admitting credibility evidence in-
volves restricting the accepted parameters of jury common sense.
When common sense is defined narrowly, the prejudice antici-
pated from the admission of empirical data on credibility is more
easily reconciled with the tradition of relying on the jury's com-
mon sense in those areas where jurors arguably lack common
sense or experience. In such areas, expert testimony can be admit-
ted to supplement deficiencies in experience, rather than to
counter-biases or myths resulting from prior experiences. Courts
that permit assistance to jurors may thus attempt to resolve the
delicate question of whether the expert testimony would replace or
merely supplement the jury's decision-making process by describ-
ing the scope of common sense narrowly. Instead of viewing ex-
pert testimony as challenging the very essence of the jury func-
tion, courts may analogize psychological testimony about
credibility to well-established exceptions beyond the boundaries of
213. See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 405 (permitting proof of character by reputation and
opinion evidence but not the more probative and prejudicial evidence of specific acts).
214. 382 N.W.2d 91 (Iowa 1986). This case should not be confused with the differ-
ent case by the same name, discussed supra text accompanying notes 197-202.
215. Id. at 98.
216. Id. at 97-98.
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common sense. An example of such an exception is testimony
about a witness' mental condition.217
While this approach appears to avoid a direct confrontation
between the traditional conception of the jury role and the empiri-
cal data of the psychologists, courts must still determine where
common sense leaves off and diversity of experience begins. This
new question still forces courts to define common sense, and to
consider the psychological studies to determine the contours of
common sense. Consequently, the new analysis is no different than
the original question posed regarding the efficacy of common
sense-based decision making. The result of a court's beginning
down the "slippery slope" of narrowing the scope of common
sense could be the complete replacement of jury common sense
with psychological evaluations of credibility.
iii. The Flexible Reliability Test
Some courts have limited the prejudicial impact of expert
credibility testimony by abandoning the "general acceptance" test
of Frye v. United States218 and adopting a more flexible relevancy
test as did the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Downing.21 9 In Downing, the court rejected the Frye test,220 re-
placing the "general acceptance" standard with a more flexible,
multiple-factor test to govern the admission of novel scientific evi-
dence.2 2 ' The court stated:
In our view, Rule 702 requires that a district court ruling upon
the admission of (novel) scientific evidence, i.e., scientific evi-
dence whose scientific fundaments are not suitable candidates
for judicial notice, conduct a preliminary inquiry focusing on (1)
the soundness and reliability of the process or technique used in
generating the evidence, (2) the possibility that admitting the
evidence would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and (3)
the proffered connection between the scientific research or test
result to be presented, and particular disputed factual issues in
the case.222
Under the new test, the Court in Downing concluded that expert
217. See sources cited supra note 55.
218. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See supra text accompanying notes 159-
162.
219. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
220. Id. at 1232, 1233 n.11.
221. Id. at 1237.
222. Id.
1989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
testimony about the unreliability of eyewitnesses was reliable and,
therefore, generally admissible.22 3
iv. Special Jury Instructions
Still other courts have minimized the prejudicial effect of the
psychological data by determining not to admit it as evidence, but
rather to include it in special jury instructions.224 A model jury
instruction on the potential for eyewitness misidentification was
offered by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in United
States v. Telfaire,225 and adopted by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 226 The instruction cautions the jury to consider eyewit-
ness testimofiy "with great care. ' 227 Other jurisdictions use differ-
ent instructions228 to achieve the same objective. These special in-
structions have been criticized, however, as ineffective. 229
3. The Testimony is Central
Some courts have admitted expert testimony on policy
grounds that are not in the plain language of the applicable rules
of evidence. The most prevalent policy rationale upon which ex-
pert testimony has been admitted is centrality - how important
the evidence is to the outcome of the case. In these trials, witness
credibility is exceedingly important because it is not supplemented
by corroborating evidence.
Several recent decisions illustrate the centrality analysis. In
these cases, the courts have held that the exclusion of "helpful"
expert testimony on credibility constituted reversible error. In
People v. McDonald,3 0 the defendant was convicted of murder in
223. Id. at 1243-44.
224. See, e.g., United States v. Zeiler, 470 F.2d 717, 720 (3d Cir. 1972) ("The dan-
ger that the jury may give undue weight to eyewitnesses' testimony can be further guarded
against by appropriate jury instructions.").
225. 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
226. United States v. Holley, 502 F.2d 273, 277-78 (4th Cir. 1974).
227. Carey v. Maryland, 617 F.Supp. 1143, 1147 (D. Md. 1985), af'd, 795 F.2d
1007 (4th Cir. 1986).
228. Commonwealth v. Francis, 390 Mass. 89, 100, 453 N.E.2d 1204, 1210 (1983).
229. The instructions are based on the court's own misconceptions and omit refer-
ence to weighing the various factors involved. E.g., Greene, Judges Instructions on Eyewit-
ness Testimony: Evaluation and Revision, 18 J. OF APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 252, 273
(1987) (Judges are often "unaware of the fallibility of eyewitness evidence" and, thus, are
not "motivated to give instructions which stress caution in evaluating eyewitness
evidence.").
230. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 690 P.2d 709, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984).
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a California state court and sentenced to death. The only evidence
tying the defendant to the crime was the testimony of four eyewit-
nesses. Their identifications all contained potential grounds for
reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant committed the
crime.231 At trial, the defendant offered the testimony of an expert
on the unreliability of eyewitness identification, but the trial court
rejected the testimony. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, the defendant's conviction was reversed. The California
Supreme Court held that although the admissibility of such expert
testimony falls primarily within the trial court's sound discretion:
[w]hen an eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key ele-
ment of the prosecution's case but is not substantially corrobo-
rated by evidence giving it independent reliability, and the de-
fendant offers qualified expert testimony on specific
psychological factors shown by the record that could have af-
fected the accuracy of the identification but are not likely to be
fully known to or understood by the jury, it will ordinarily be
error to exclude that testimony." 2
In State v. Chapple,233 the defendant was convicted in an Ar-
izona state court of three counts of first-degree murder. The only
evidence connecting him to the crime was the uncorroborated tes-
timony of two eyewitnesses.234 Defense witnesses testified that the
defendant was in another state at the time of the crimes. The de-
fendant also offered expert testimony about the factors that bear
on the unreliability of eyewitness identification. The trial court re-
fused to permit the expert to testify. On appeal, the Arizona Su-
preme Court reversed the lower court's decision to exclude the ex-
pert testimony, holding that while the admissibility of this type of
testimony was within the trial court's discretion, the testimony
here would have been "of significant assistance" to the jury on "a
number of substantive issues of ultimate fact.231 5 To exclude the
testimony in this case was consequently an abuse of discretion.
The centrality analysis has been applied to the credibility of
more than just eyewitnesses to murder. In Skamarocius v.
State,2 36 the defendant was convicted in an Alaska state court of
sexual assault. The only evidence linking the defendant to the
231. Id. at 353, 690 P.2d at 711, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
232. Id. at 377, 690 P.2d at 727, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 254.
233. 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983).
234. Id. at 285, 660 P.2d at 1212-13.
235. Id. at 297, 660 P.2d at 1224.
236. 731 P.2d 63 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
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crime was the uncorroborated identification of the victim and a
towel, which the alleged perpetrator had used during the assault.
Once again, the trial court rejected the defendant's offer of expert
psychological testimony about the unreliability of eyewitness testi-
mony. On appeal, the Alaska Court of Appeals held the trial
judge had abused his discretion in excluding the testimony. The
testimony was central to the defendant's case and might have dis-
pelled any misconceptions the jurors might have had about the
meaning of an eyewitness' confidence. The court stated, however,
that exclusion is proper when the eyewitness testimony is corrobo-
rated by substantial physical evidence or a co-defendant's
testimony.237
The centrality approach of the courts in McDonald, Chapple,
and Skamarocius is inconsistent with a traditional evidentiary
analysis that does not factor into the calculation of admissibility
considerations such as the importance of the offered evidence or
the lack of corroboration.23  The centrality analysis may be char-
acterized as a compromise between the common-sense and empiri-
cal approaches to evaluating witness credibility. It is the most suc-
cessful compromise between the two extremes because it only
indirectly confronts the dual evidentiary concerns* of assistance
and prejudice, switching the relevant question from "Can the jury
be assisted by this information?" to "How important is the credi-
bility determination to the outcome of the case?" When expert
testimony is admitted under this approach, the court is stating in
essence that whatever prejudice may be associated with the testi-
mony is outweighed by the importance of a credibility assessment
to a just resolution of the case.
237. Id. at 67. In State v. Taylor, 50 Wash. App. 481, 749 P.2d 181 (1988), the
defendant had been convicted of burglary and assault. The sole evidence against the de-
fendant was the eyewitness testimony of the victim. The trial court excluded the proffered
expert testimony about eyewitness misidentification. The Washington Court of Appeals re-
versed recognizing that "the exclusion of such testimony is an abuse of discretion" in cer-
tain situations, including this one in which the defendant's identification is the central issue
at the trial, the defendant has an alibi defense, and there is little or no other evidence
against the defendant. Id. at 488-89, 749 P.2d at 184; see also State v. Moon, 45 Wash.
App. 692, 726 P.2d 1263 (1986) (Exclusion of expert testimony which could help the jury
determine the reliability of eyewitness identification is an abuse of discretion when identifi-
cation is a principal issue.).
238. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (considering only probative value and prejudicial
effect of the particular piece of evidence, not as viewed with respect to the entire case).
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D. The Inconclusiveness of the Courts' Response to
Psychologically Assisted Credibility Assessments
In determining whether to admit the testimony of psychologi-
cal experts or special jury instructions on witness credibility,
courts have developed several tendencies. They have considered
such factors as the generality of the testimony, its reliability and
its helpfulness. Despite the recurrence of these themes, the con-
ventional, evidentiary rules-based analysis has yielded no persua-
sive conclusion about the admissibility of expert testimony or spe-
cial jury instructions concerning witness credibility. Even though
many courts recognize, for example, that the psychological data
reliably suggest that jurors assess credibility inaccurately, they re-
main in doubt as to whether educating the jury about credibility
would improve the accuracy of these evaluations and thereby sat-
isfy the helpfulness requirement. 39
The use of alternative approaches such as centrality holds out
some promise for reconciling the competing policies, but does not
seem to be justified by a traditional analysis under the rules of
evidence. The following section argues that the centrality ap-
proach is the only one that makes sense.
IV. THE STRUCTURAL IMPLICATIONS OF ABANDONING
COMMON SENSE AND ADOPTING A PSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF
THE JURY
"I think there is such a thing as Quality, but that as soon as
you try to define it, something goes haywire.'240
A rules-based analysis of the admissibility of psychological
information on credibility reveals the inability of courts to ap-
proach such evidence in a logical, persuasive or even unified man-
ner. This is due to reasons associated with the underlying tension
between a jury system modeled on social science data and a more
traditional conception of the criminal trial process based on the
jurors' common sense.
This section suggests that an alternative to the inconclusive
doctrinal/evidentiary analysis described in the preceding section is
239. See Cutler, Dexter, & Penrod, Expert Testimony and Jury Decision-Making:
An Empirical Analysis, 7 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 215, 223 (1989); Cutler, Dexter & Pen-
rod, The Eyewitness, supra note 182, at 329.
240. R. PERSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE 184 (Bantam
New Age ed. 32nd printing 1985).
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necessary to resolve this issue. The proffered alternative analysis
directly confronts the offending underlying conflict evaluating the
competing approaches to assessing credibility in light of the three
primary objectives of the criminal justice system: truth-finding,"4
dispute resolution,242 and representation-reinforcement. 43 The
analysis suggests that the value of common sense is both overshad-
owed and undervalued by the psychological studies. The section
concludes that systemic concerns such as public confidence in the
verdict and the representation function of the jury justify the con-
tinued reliance on common sense. The section argues further,
however, that psychological testimony or data should be admissi-
ble when strong policy concerns are overriding, such as when cred-
ibility assessment is central to the outcome of the case and the
presumption of innocence is threatened.
The alternative analysis offered in this section replaces the
current model of juror functioning, which relies on juror credibil-
ity assessments using common sense, with a model that presup-
poses the necessity for expert psychological testimony about credi-
bility.244 Such a system is based on the importance of juror
education through expert witnesses. The experts are presumed
necessary to provide jurors with a scientific framework for making
credibility assessments. This section evaluates, in terms of its ef-
fect on the objectives of the jury system, the hypothetical model's
use of expert testimony to assist the jury on credibility questions
and its corresponding abandonment of the principle of the suffi-
ciency of common sense.
A. Replacing Current Assumptions with New Ones
It is well-established within current law that, as a general
rule, the common sense of the jury - along with the traditional
assistance provided by cross-examination, legal argument and the
opportunity to observe the witness' demeanor - provides suffi-
cient guidance for credibility evaluations. The current model of
the jury system is based upon this principle. If, however, we reject
241. See supra text accompanying notes 28-35.
242. See supra section I.A.2, p. 172.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
244. This analysis is loosely based on a methodology proposed by Professor Unger.
Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REv. 561 (1983). Professor
Unger offered a method of analysis called deviationist doctrine. While the actual methodol-
ogy used in this paper is vastly different from Professor Unger's practice and intent there
are still some similarities to the deviationist doctrine technique.
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this principle on the ground that it is empirically incorrect, we can
hypothesize a different model of the jury system. This model
would be based on the assumption that jurors are unable to assess
accurately credibility questions that either fall outside of their
common experience (e.g., with respect to sexual child abuse) or
fall within their common experience but are distorted by
prejudices resulting from prior experiences (e.g., with respect to
eyewitnesses).
This section replaces the current prevailing assumptions
about jurors' common sense with counter-assumptions and exam-
ines the consequences. Thus, the model of the competent juror
armed with common sense is replaced by that of the limited-expe-
rience juror influenced by prejudices, myths and stereotypes. The
practical consequences of such a change would be immediate and
are illustrated by the following examples.
1. Areas of Conflict
The following examples illustrate the most prominent areas
of conflict between the two models of the jury system. An eyewit-
ness, after making a positive, at-the-scene identification of the sus-
pect in an armed robbery, is unsure two years later at trial
whether the defendant is the same armed robber.245 According to
traditional theory, the jury is capable of evaluating the lapse in
the witness' memory without assistance. According to the counter-
view, an expert should be permitted to testify about the signifi-
cance of such a lapse, particularly since studies have shown that
memory loss does not occur gradually but geometrically. Simi-
larly, whether the eyewitness expresses either great or little confi-
dence in her identification, jurors should be informed that there
appears to be no relationship between the level of confidence and
the accuracy of an identification.246
A six-and-a-half-year-old child claims to have been molested
by an adult. There are no other witnesses to the molestation or
additional corroborative evidence. The dominant view today would
245. Cf. Wynn v. United States, 538 A.2d 1139 (D.C. 1988) (sixth amendment right
to a speedy trial may be affected and prejudice to the defendant incurred when trial takes
place 24 months after alleged assault by prison inmate and defense witnesses are unable
accurately to recall the events).
246. See Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, Correlation of Eyewitness Accuracy
and Confidence: Optimality Hypothesis Revisited, 72 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 691, 694
(1987) (concluding that eyewitness confidence is not correlative to eyewitness accuracy).
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not permit expert testimony on the issue of the child's veracity.
Under the counter-view, a juror, although she was young once,
would be deemed not to have the tools necessary to deal with such
a sensitive and foreign question of credibility. An expert who uses
doll simulations, who is either familiar with the common responses
of abused children, has performed various psychological studies on
child abuse, or is familiar with this child, would, therefore, be
called to supplement and shed light on the testimony of the child
victim. The expert would assist the jurors to calibrate their assess-
ments of the complaining witness' testimony relative to their as-
sessments of the alleged perpetrator's testimony.
Through these examples, it is apparent that the hypothetical
model is reluctant to rely on the naked ability of jurors to assess
the credibility of witnesses. This reluctance attaches not only to
sensitive cases, but to all cases, no matter how ordinary. Experts
would "help" the jury even in ordinary cases, because jurors are
considered ill-equipped to assess credibility evidence.
The hypothetical model views cross-examination primarily as
a means of gathering information, rather than organizing or
weighing it. Thus, cross-examination and the arguments of coun-
sel are not thought to limit and guide jury discretion adequately,
nor to minimize prejudices and erroneous evaluation mechanisms
sufficiently. These techniques are not relied on to provide the jury
with an effective measuring device. Instead, the hypothetical
model uses expert psychological testimony to counteract the
prejudices that are inherent in the current concept of the jury
system.247
2. The Sources of the Current and Counter-Assumptions
The presently dominant view, which presumes that jurors are
competent to decide credibility questions using mere common
sense, 24s is justified primarily by the goal of representation-rein-
247. These prejudices are currently recognized by the courts. E.g., United States v.
Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (in which a special identification instruction was
created for use in cases when eyewitnesses testify).
248. Recently two commentators have noted that:
This [view] and its pessimistic conclusion seem to rest on several implicit as-
sumptions about psychology and the proper functioning of the trial system. They
reflect the belief that our trial process produced better results before psycholo-
gists started meddling with it; now that lawyers are using sophisticated tech-
niques based on psycholegal research, they are upsetting the natural balance and
subverting the proper function of the trial. Moreover, critics claim, trial attor-
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forcement.249 By embracing the unassisted role of common sense,
it assures that jurors and, by implication, all members of the com-
munity are responsible for the verdict. The verdict, then, is repre-
sentative of the community's viewpoint. This heightened trust in
the jury theoretically generates more confidence in the result.
The hypothetical model, on the other hand, draws its power
primarily from the truth-finding function. Scientific information
about credibility assessments is adduced to enhance the accuracy
of credibility assessments and consequently of trial outcomes.
While assistance from professionals might weaken the premise
that the jury's decision is representative of and speaks for the
community, community approval should remain high because of
the increased accuracy of the result. Jurors will arguably perform
better if trained and educated. Instead of permitting the jury un-
checked discretion to assess credibility, which effectively invites
jurors to allow their prejudices and ignorance to influence deter-
minations of credibility, the hypothetical model would structure
jury discretion to ensure accuracy. Thus, the hypothetical model
rejects the belief that "jurors in their 'natural' state, not subjected
to psychological persuasion techniques, will return more accurate,
impartial verdicts, based on a rational consideration of the
evidence."2 50
B. The Impact of Exchanging Current Assumptions for
Counter-Assumptions
In some respects, the new system would be radically different
from its predecessor. In other respects, the similarities would be
striking. The following three sections will examine these differ-
ences and similarities.
1. A Different System
The replacement of the presently dominant assumptions with
neys have become capable of inducing jurors to make bad decisions based on
biases and other improper factors, and no existing mechanism can prevent such
abuse. This argument can be broken down into several psychological assump-
tions about how jurors reach decisions and the nature of psycholegal research,
and several legal assumptions about the theory and structure of trials.
Tanford & Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer
Collaboration, 66 N.C.L. REv. 741, 743 (1988).
249. See supra text accompanying notes 37-43.
250. Tanford & Tanford, supra note 248, at 743.
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the counter-assumptions would lead to changes in the institutional
roles of judge, juror, expert and attorney. The judge would share
with the expert some of her power to disclose general principles
and rules.2 51 The expert would gain a greater ability to influence
the outcome of the case. Jurors, while retaining the power to de-
cide the facts, would be influenced by more experts than before.
The attorneys would probably have to adjust their theory of the
case and the structure of their arguments to accommodate the ex-
pert testimony, particularly if they formerly would have based
their arguments on stereotypes or myths embraced by common
sense. The change in roles would result in a reallocation of court-
room power.
This shift in power would also cause a shift in responsibilities.
While jurors would have the same responsibility over the outcome
of the case, the expert's increased role might make him appear at
least partly responsible for erroneous verdicts. The judge, mean-
while, would have greater responsibility in determining exactly
what type of psychological evidence is admissible and under what
circumstances. The jurors would be responsible for reeducating
themselves about common-sense beliefs that they might hold
strongly.
This reordering would also produce other, equally significant
effects. The expert's provision of general information might, for
example, encroach on the judicial function. The facts dispensed by
the expert resemble legislative facts more than adjudicative
facts. 252 Thus, the expert might be perceived as a quasi-judge who
educates the jury not on the law but on how the jury can carry out
its role as fact-finder. 53
Reliance on psychological studies of human behavior could
eventually lead to sweeping changes in the entire jury system and
the rules that govern it.254 Psychological studies, as interpreted by
251. This is because expert testimony provides information that the jurors may treat
like judicially noticed facts. See generally VIRGINIA Note, supra note 44 (arguing against
permitting expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome).
252. "Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legislative facts
. . . are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether
in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a
legislative body." FED. R. EvID. 201(a) advisory committee's note.
253. One commentator called this new type of evidence "social frameworks," mean-
ing "the use of general conclusions from social science research in determining factual
issues in a specific case." Walker & Monahan, Social Frameworks: A New Use of Social
Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559, 559 (1987).
254. For an interesting parallel, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) where the
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expert psychologists, could determine what judges say to the ju-
rors about understanding the evidence, how they say it, and when
they say it.2"5 Experts could be used to inform jurors about how to
perform their deliberations properly and about the psychology of
being a juror. Jurors could even be instructed on the effects of the
way testimony is presented. 56
Such professionalization of the system through the wide-
spread use of psychologists would have a significant impact. Over-
all, the impact would be difficult to accept. An amateur jury, al-
though it may make mistakes, remains a preferable symbol
because the acceptance of the counter-assumptions would serve to
reduce public confidence in the criminal justice system. The public
might see elitism as the motivating force behind the replacement
of common sense with expert guidance.257
The adverse effects of psychological intervention have been
well-documented in the context of the insanity defense. In Dur-
ham v. United States,5 8 the D.C. Circuit held that the appropri-
ate test for determining insanity was whether the criminal conduct
was a "product" of a mental disease or defect.25 9 This test made
the definition of a legal concept fully dependent on the medical
community. The "product" test eventually proved to be no test at
all, but merely the sum of the views of the medical profession. It
engendered mistrust of the psychiatric community and was even-
tually abandoned. 260 A similar disintegration could readily occur
with expert credibility testimony.
Another significant effect of this reordering would be to re-
Court rejected reliance on purely social science data for Equal Protection analysis. See
infra note 279.
255. For an interesting study of the influence a judge can have on a jury by the use
of certain tones of voice or nonverbal behavior, see Note, The Appearance of Justice:
Judges' Verbal and Nonverbal Behavior in Criminal Jury Trials, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 89
(1985), summarized in Guilty Looks, Sci. AM., June 1986, at 72.
256. The implications of extending the hypothetical model are best observed in the
area of jury instruction and deliberation. This model would require that jurors expressly be
made aware of how the presumption of innocence applies to the evidence, and how to sift
through the evidence in applying the law. Merely reading the instructions would not be
sufficient; jurors would require much more preparation. Judges would then themselves need
expert assistance in how to instruct jurors effectively.
257. See also supra notes 37-43 (discussing the representation-reinforcement func-
tion of the jury).
258. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
259. Id. at 874-75 (citing State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1870); State v. Jones, 50 N.H.
369, 398 (1871)).
260. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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strict the jury in several ways. Increased expert testimony would
limit the jury's discretion to assess credibility and, by implication,
its power to "nullify" the testimony of any witness. Jurors would
have to learn to approach many ordinary questions from a
counter-intuitive perspective. Moreover, as the quantity of infor-
mation the jury must assimilate increased, the more difficult the
jury's task would become.
2. A Similar System
While the replacement of the presently dominant assumptions
with the counter-assumptions would modify the operation of the
judicial system, the system would remain the same in many ways.
The dichotomy of a binary order, involving assumptions and
counter-assumptions, would still exist. The essential purpose of the
jury would remain unchanged. The jury would continue to be re-
sponsible for finding the facts based on what the court admits into
evidence. The jury would still weigh the evidence and evaluate the
credibility of witnesses. More significantly, the attempt to elimi-
nate reliance on common sense would not eliminate the variable of
human experience from the jury evaluation process. Instead, the
psychological approach essentially would replace common sense
analysis with another value-laden approach. The values involved
would be those of the experts and those of the jurors in assessing
the experts. Because of the qualitative nature of credibility assess-
ments, which require subtle and individualized evaluations, the
psychological data would be subject to a new set of biases, myths,
and errors that would vary with each juror. Thus, under any sys-
tem, the jury process appears to require an irreducible use of com-
mon sense. Plain logic and rationality cannot simply be replaced
with a completely scientific analysis of credibility. Thus, just as
the polygraph has failed to completely replace the jury's evalua-
tion of witness credibility, a psychological model of the criminal
justice system would not eliminate the need for the jury's judg-
ment or common sense.
i. But Not a Better Similar System
The best measure of the legal model is whether the testimony
has a positive effect on the objectives of the system. If use of ex-
pert testimony is perceived as excessive, it could very well under-
mine public confidence in the results that juries reach. This would
be due, in part, to society's view of the discipline of psychology:
[Vol. 40:165
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There is little doubt that the underlying concern has much to do
with judicial distrust of the science or art of psychology, along
with an ambivalent attitude toward the jury. On the one hand,
courts articulate a strong belief in the value of the jury system
and a desire to protect the traditional role of the jury as fact
finder. At the same time, there is often a lack of faith in the
jury's ability to discern truth that is reflected in the decision to
withhold information from the jury because of the fear that lay
jurors will be unable to pierce through its "aura of scientific reli-
ability" to perform their highly valued function.2" l
Thus, while psychological data point out correctly the deficiencies
in lay assessments of credibility, mistrust of psychology diminishes
the value of the data.
Public confidence in the jurors themselves, and not just in the
results they reach, would also decrease under the new system. To
the extent that the public believes the psychological testimony to
be true, the public is likely to question whether jurors selected
from a cross-section of the community can render a fair verdict
based on their own experience.2 62 The inference is that if jurors
cannot resolve basic questions of credibility, what questions can
they resolve? If experts are more knowledgeable about such com-
mon questions, should not the jurors defer to the experts? Because
it assumes that the jury is incapable of performing a function so
central to its role, the psychological model would eventually erode
the public's confidence and trust in the jury's ability to do what is
right.
ii. The Expert as Unintended Moralist
The values the jury chooses to adopt and govern their deliber-
ations are an important aspect of the concept of democracy as
applied to the jury system.2 63 Moreover, the expert's testimony,
although substantive, is not without its own set of values that may
influence the jury. Thus, even the expert as educator must be
261. Ingulli, supra note 21, at 153.
262. It is interesting that jurors have difficulty with many types of technical evi-
dence. Cf. Thompson & Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence in Criminal Tri-
als: The Prosecutor's Fallacy & the Defense Attorney's Fallacy, I I LAw & HUM. BEHAV.
167 (1987) (concerning jurors' underutilization of base and incidence rates for forensic
tests in which an object found at the scene of the crime is matched to the suspect).
263. See Gold, supra note 37, at 498 (fragmenting the courtroom decisionmaking
power bars the state from using "the judicial system of as tool of governmental oppres-
sion"); supra, text accompanying notes 37-43.
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aware that any interpretation he makes carries value assumptions
and that his discussion of witness evaluation is in effect about
"goodness" and "badness." Thus, the jury's choice of values under
the psychological model is impeded by the experts.
a. Truth-finding
Psychological evidence about credibility is considerably less
certain of its assertions than physical scientific evidence, such as
DNA-typing, blood-testing for alcohol or hair analysis. Yet, its
imprimatur on the jury may carry a much higher certitude.
The difference in the nature of the evidence is readily seen by
example. In one controversial case,2"" for example, defendant
Gary Dotson was convicted of rape primarily on the testimony of
the victim, Kathleen Crowell Webb. Webb recanted her trial tes-
timony approximately seven years after the trial.26 5 Despite the
recantation, however, Dotson was not released from prison. In
1988, technological advances in DNA comparison showed that the
semen found on Ms. Webb could have been that of only 5 % of
the male population and not that of Mr. Dotson.2 61 The psycho-
logical testimony does not pretend to provide such exactitude.267
Instead, psychological evidence, necessarily introduces the subjec-
tive variable of human evaluation. Unlike evidence of DNA com-
parisons, and like quantifications of pain and suffering, psycholog-
ical evidence does not preclude juror speculations. Thus, the claim
that expert-psychological testimony improves juror accuracy does
not appear to be warranted.
b. Realism and Credibility
Expert credibility testimony based on social science data can
be viewed as a legal realist analysis of credibility assessment. The
psychological data on credibility, while not establishing "with cer-
tainty the existence of any fact that is of consequence to an issue
264. People v. Dotson, 99 I11. App. 3d 117, 424 N.E.2d 1319 (1981).
265. People v. Dotson, 163 Il1. App. 3d 419, 516 N.E.2d 718 (1987).
266. Gorner & Barnum, Nicarico Case to Put Genetic Tests on Trial, Chi. Tribune,
May 28, 1989, at 1. For another example of the use of such testing, see Andrews v. State,
533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
267. "Clearly, the social sciences do not claim empiricism, or the scientific exacti-
tude that physics and medicine aspire to." Note, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse
Prosecutions: A Spectrum of Uses, 68 B.U.L. REv 155, 181 (1988) (citing State v. Logue,
372 N.W.2d 151, 157 (S.D. 1985)).
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at trial," is arguably, as the proponents of legal realism might
conclude, "capable of providing information regarding the
probability that something did or did not occur."268 General
probabilities, however, do not assist the fact finder to determine
the truth about a specific case.
Psychological testimony, like legal realism, fails to provide a
viable alternative to present methods of credibility assessment.
The social science data does not itself tell jurors how to determine
the weight to give to each credibility factor, how and when'to sub-
stitute those factors for their own prejudices and experiences, or
how to apply the factors to each witness. Instead, expert testimony
can only supplant the jury's role, be ignored or confuse the jury.
The realist exposure of biases and prejudices may reveal that
common sense is not value-neutral, but not necessarily that its use
is invalid. The normative component of a jury verdict is essential
to the governance of acceptable minimum standards of behavior.
The normative component requires values that include past exper-
iences and biases. The realist rejection of bias and prejudice con-
sequently abandons an important component of jury action and,
perhaps even more significantly, fails to provide its own neutral
framework. Instead, it replaces the old biases with new ones.
The hypothetical model is also deficient in failing to recog-
nize that the elimination of bias and prejudice may be impossible.
As one commentator noted:
To psychologists, however, the unbiased juror does not exist. Ju-
rors, like all other human decision makers, cannot evaluate evi-
dence as if it were sui generis but must always relate it to past
experiences and preconceived beliefs about the world: the knowl-
edge structures they have accumulated over a lifetime. Based on
this premise some psychologists have concluded that the purpose
of jury selection cannot be the selection of an impartial jury.
Rather, it must be the selection of the most favorably biased
jury.269
To compensate for the fact that jurors must guess as to credibility
and that biases are unavoidable, common sense is a necessary and
valuable repository of morality, community intuition and
judgment.
268. Walker & Monahan, supra note 253, at 595; cf. People v. Collins, 68 Cal. 2d
319, 438 P.2d 33, 66 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1968) (rejecting the use of statistical probabilities to
infer guilt).
269. Gold, supra note 37, at 492 (citations omitted).
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That social science data are an inadequate basis for justifia-
ble legal rules is exemplified by the experience of the Supreme
Court of the United States in determining the number of jurors
required in criminal cases. Historically, the American jury was
composed of twelve individuals from the community."' This num-
ber of jurors was widely accepted, but not officially recognized as
constitutionally based. In the 1970s, the Court considered several
cases involving the number of jurors required. In Williams v.
Florida,271 the Court held that a six-person jury in a criminal case
satisfied the sixth amendment requirement of trial by jury.272 The
Court noted that "the reliability of the jury as a fact-finder hardly
seems likely to be a function of its size. '273 Many social scientists
accepted the Court's implicit invitation to analyze the relationship
between jury size and jury function.21 4
Eight years later, in the face of shrinking juries in several
states, the Court prohibited juries of fewer than six members. In
Ballew v. Georgia,2 75 the Court held that a five-person jury in a
criminal case violated the constitutional requirement of trial by
jury. The Court relied on empirical research in reaching this
conclusion:
While we adhere to, and reaffirm our holding in Williams v.
Florida, these studies, most of which have been made since Wil-
liams was decided in 1970, lead us to conclude that the purpose
and functioning of the jury in a criminal trial is seriously im-
paired, and to a constitutional- degree, by a reduction in size to
below six members. 276
The Court went on to say, "the assembled data raise substantial
doubt about the reliability and appropriate representation of
270. For the possible origin of this requirement, see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 87-90 (1970).
271. 399 U.S. 78.
272. Id. at 80. (The Florida law provided for a six person jury in all but capital
cases.).
273. Id. at 100-01.
274. E.g., NEw JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REVISION COMMISSION, SIX-MEMBER JURIES
(1971); Davis, Kerr, Atkin, Holt & Meck, The Decision Processes of 6- and 12- person
Mock Juries Assigned Unanimous and Two-Thirds Majority Rules, 32 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOLOGY I (1975); Diamond, A Jury Experiment Reanalyzed, 7 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 520 (1974); Lempert, Uncovering "'Nondiscernible" Differences: Empirical Research
and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MICH. L. REV. 643 (1975); Nagel & Neef, Deductive Model-
ing to Determine an Optimum Jury Size and Fraction Required to Convict, 1975 WASH.
U.L.Q. 933.
275. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
276. Id. at 239.
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panels smaller than six."'27 7 Even so, the focal point of the Court's
decision was not its interpretation of the social-science data. The
Court conceded that "we readily admit that we do not pretend to
discern a clear line between six members and five."'2 78 The Court
rightly hesitated to rely on studies that cannot and should not re-
place its own legal conclusions. A legal rule derived from current
social science data would be vulnerable to attack from future
studies that contradict the findings upon which the present case
relies.279
V. A NEW RULE OF EVIDENCE ON EXPERT CREDIBILITY
TESTIMONY
Despite the many reasons for excluding psychological data on
credibility questions, there is at least one strong policy reason sup-
porting its admissibility in certain situations. That reason is the
presumption that a criminal defendant is innocent until proven
guilty 80 beyond a reasonable doubt.2 ' In 1970, the Supreme
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. A parallel lies in the Equal Protection Clause analysis of gender discrimination.
In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Supreme Court considered the constitutional-
ity of an Oklahoma statute that required different minimum ages for men and women in
the purchase of 3.2 percent beer. Statistics were offered in support of the gender disparity:
"The appellees introduced a variety of statistical surveys. First, an analysis of arrest statis-
tics for 1973 demonstrated that 18-20 year-old male arrests for 'driving under the influ-
ence' and 'drunkenness' substantially exceeded female arrests for that same age period."
Id. at 200. "Similarly, youths aged 17-21 were found to be overrepresented among those
killed or injured in traffic accidents, with males again numerically exceeding females in this
regard." Id. at 201. The Court concluded, however, that the statistical support for a gen-
der-based classification was unpersuasive. Id. The Court stated that the statistical "short-
comings . . . seriously impugn their value to equal protection analysis." Id. at 202. The
Court then focused directly on the relationship between statistics and the Equal Protection
Clause:
It is unrealistic to expect either members of the judiciary or state officials to be
well versed in the rigors of experimental or statistical technique. But this merely
illustrates that proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious
business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that
underlies the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 204.
280. This presumption is realized in the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of
proof. In In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), the Supreme Court considered whether due
process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a juvenile proceeding. The Court, in
concluding that it does, stated that the standard "is a prime instrument for reducing the
risk of convictions resting on factual error." Id. at 363. This standard "impresses on the
trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude of the facts in issue."
Id. at 364 (quoting Dorsen and Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of Juvenile Law, I
FAM. L.Q., No. 4, 1, 26 (1967)). The Court added that "[tihe standard provides concrete
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Court held expressly that in a criminal prosecution a state must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements of its case.28 2
The presumption of innocence and the high burden of proof are
fundamental safeguards that protect the defendant from the
stigma of conviction, the loss of property, and the loss of life. Con-
sequently, jury instructions, legal argument, and the requirement
of competent proof are tailored to prevent a rush to judgment.
Underlying this policy is the value that "it is better that ten guilty
persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."2 In light of this
policy, the following rule of evidence is proposed to provide a com-
prehensive framework within which to treat psychological data on
credibility assessments.
A. Problem - Victim Versus Defendant
The theoretical presumption of innocence is subject to nullifi-
cation by the finder of fact. This presumption is especially vulner-
able when the primary evidence in a case juxtaposes the victim's
claims and the defendant's rebuttal without significant corroborat-
ing evidence. The contradictions leave the jury with what often
appears to be an "either-or" situation regarding the truth. The
natural inclination in such a situation is to balance the competing
testimony, and to ignore the artificial burden of proof.
B. Solution - the Centrality Approach
To protect more fully the presumption of innocence when the
presumption may be compromised, the defendant should be per-
mitted to introduce expert testimony on credibility. The threshold
for admission should be drawn where the evidence could make a
reasonable difference to the outcome of the case. Thus, the cen-
trality approach favored in State v. Chapple 84 and People v. Mc-
Donald28 5 is preferable, although not because the expert testimony
itself is justifiable under the traditional rules of evidence. Rather,
the testimony becomes justifiable because of its value in safe-
substance for the presumption of innocence . Id. at 363.
281. Id. at 362.
282. Id. at 364.
283. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
284. 135 Ariz. 281, 297, 660 P.2d 1208, 1224 (1983); see supra text accompanying
notes 233-235.
285. 37 Cal. 3d 351, 355, 690 P.2d 709, 711, 208 Cal. Rptr. 236, 238 (1984); see
supra text accompanying notes 230-232.
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guarding the presumption of innocence or the corollary right to
mount a defense.
The following, proposed rule attempts to reflect the proper
value of common sense and the inadequacy of the courts to pro-
vide coherent guidance with respect to psychological evidence,
while at the same time acknowledging the importance of the pre-
sumption of innocence.286 The rule parallels in many ways the
treatment of character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(a). As the Advisory Committee noted about that rule,
'[c]haracter evidence is of slight probative value and may be
very prejudicial. It tends to distract the trier of fact from the
main question of what actually happened on the particular occa-
sion. It subtly permits the trier of fact to reward the good man
and to punish the bad man because of their respective characters
despite what the evidence in the case shows actually
happened.'287
Similar concerns have shaped the drafting of the rule that follows.
1. The Proposed Rule
"(a) PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE GENERALLY. Evidence of a
scientific, psychological or comparative nature bearing on evalua-
tions of witness credibility is not admissible to assist the trier of
fact with credibility assessments, except:
(1) when offered by the accused, or
(2) when offered on behalf of a complainant to rebut a claim
of fabrication.
(b) If the court determines that proffered psychological evi-
dence falls within exception (a)(1) or (a)(2), it shall balance the
prejudicial impact of the testimony against its probative value.
The Court must also take into account the form in which it is
offered and the centrality of a credibility assessment to the out-
come of the trial to determine whether to admit the evidence.
(c) If psychological evidence satisfies the requirements of
parts (a) and (b) of this provision, it shall be admitted. The court
shall have discretion to permit testimony by a qualified expert or a
jury instruction designed to accomplish the same end."
286. In addition, in the interests of fairness, the victim will be able to use psychologi-
cal testimony to refute a claim of fabrication.
287. FED. R. EVID. 404(a) advisory committee's note (quoting CALIFORNIA LAW RE-
VISION COMMISSION, REPORT, RECORD & STUDIES, TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION AND A
STUDY RELATING TO THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 615 (1964).
1989-90]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
2. The Proposed Legislative History
A legislative history for this rule might be added as follows:
"(1) This rule is intended to apply to all types of empirical
and comparative testimony or jury instructions about the credibil-
ity of a witness, including generalized testimony about common
witness characteristics or psychological syndromes such as the
rape trauma syndrome and the undercover stress syndrome. The
common themes underlying all of the testimony and instructions
affected by this rule are that they touch on the credibility of one
or more witnesses at trial, in particular with respect to the wit-
nesses' psychological or mental processes.
(2) The purpose of credibility testimony or jury instructions
is to corroborate or undermine the testimony of another witness.
The breadth of the exclusions is intended to protect the decision-
making process of the jury from psychological data that invade
the province of the jury.
Part (a) of the rule states the general rule of exclusion and
provides for two exceptions. The first exception, (1), concerning
the accused in a criminal case, is similar to the special dispensa-
tion that Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a) provides for the ac-
cused with respect to character evidence. This dispensation is per-
mitted to effectuate fully the presumption of innocence and to
provide the defendant sufficient leeway to present a full and fair
defense.
The second exception, (2), permits the state to offer psycho-
logical evidence in rebuttal to claims of fabrication. This is a fair-
ness rule that prevents a defendant from using the exception as
both a sword and a shield. It is intended to minimize abuses by
defendants.
Even if psychological evidence falls within one of the two ex-
ceptions under Part (a), Part (b) requires additional scrutiny prior
to the admission of the evidence at trial. In particular, Part (b)
looks to the prejudicial impact of the form of the testimony and
balances the prejudice against the importance of the testimony to
the outcome of the case. In evaluating the impact of the form of
the testimony, the court should consider whether the testimony re-
fers specifically to individual witnesses at trial or the testimony
describes in general terms a larger subject-group and/or subject-
group characteristics.
In evaluating the centrality of the evidence, the court should
first determine how important the credibility assessment is to the
outcome of the case. If the court finds that the credibility issue is
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important, if not dispositive, it must then consider whether other
forms of corroborating evidence exist which minimize the impor-
tance of the psychological evidence. Only if there is little cor-
roborating evidence should the court then move to Part (c) of the
rule.
Once the court determines that some form of psychological
evidence is warranted, the court must then determine which form
it will allow. The court has a wide range of choices, from specific
testimony about witnesses at trial to general testimony about wit-
ness characteristics to other types of comparisons studied by ex-
perts. The court shall, if feasible and warranted, hear the expert
outside of the hearing of the jury and ask each attorney for an
instruction that will fairly embody the substance of the testimony.
If this is not feasible or warranted, the court shall allow experts to
testify directly to the jury."
CONCLUSION
The use of common sense by jurors to evaluate witness credi-
bility is sometimes an inaccurate method of assessing the credibil-
ity of witnesses. In recent years, there has been increasing pres-
sure to permit the results of psychological studies of credibility
assessment to be revealed to the jury by experts. The use in crimi-
nal trials of psychologically assisted credibility assessments is of
questionable admissibility when evaluated under the criteria of
usefulness to the jury and unfair prejudice. More significantly,
however, the testimony does not appear to serve the objectives of
the jury system, and particularly the representation-reinforcement
role of the jury. The use of psychological data decreases the likeli-
hood of public confidence in the verdict without any showing of
increased accuracy. It should be treated, therefore, with
skepticism.
Psychological testimony and the related psychological studies
take on greater importance, however, when they are offered to
protect the defendant's presumption of innocence. The value of
the testimony is most apparent in cases that present little corrobo-
rative evidence of a witness' testimony. In these cases, the credi-
bility assessment is often dispositive of the outcome of the case
and makes the difference between life and death or liberty and
restraint. Under such circumstances, it is appropriate to permit
some form of psychological data to be presented to the jury, either
on the defendant's behalf or to rebut the defendant's claim of gov-
ernment fabrication.
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